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INTRODUCTION

PERCEIVED INADEQUACY of the Chicago Convention
T HE
of 19441 (the Convention) to provide multilateral guidelines
relating to air traffic rights of commercial air carriers has necessitated negotiation by contracting States on a bilateral basis for
the exchange of air traffic rights between their national carriers.
Article 6 of the Convention provides that no scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
contracting State, except with the special permission or other
authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of
such permission or authorization.2 This permission usually
takes the form of a bilateral air services agreement or, at least,
an operating permit granted as an interim measure until the
formalization of such agreement. The significance of the Convention's ambivalence is that for fifty-one years after the Convention was adopted, scheduled commercial carriers have had
to refrain from free commercial competition and subject themselves to assessment by States as to whether the award of particular traffic rights to a carrier from third States would adversely
affect the operation of air services by their own carriers. There
is no free competition among scheduled commercial carriers in
the operation of air services, as there is among shipping lines in
shipping. One of the corollaries to the air traffic rights debate
has been the inquiry as to whether the present regime of bilateralism adequately serves modern exigencies of commercial aviation. As an alternative, some have suggested that air services be
considered a trade in service within the purview of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which falls under the
umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
This article will analyze the reasons that have led to the protectionism to which Article 6 of the Convention has given rise in
the area of air traffic rights and examine competition rules in
commercial aviation and the competition rules of the WTO. In
light of recent concerns of the international community that the
subject of air traffic rights should be brought within the purview
of the WTO, the conclusion will examine the possibility in the
future of competition in commercial air services being compatible with the WTO rules.
I Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
2 Id. at art. 6.
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THE GENESIS OF AIR TRAFFIC RIGHTS
A.

THE CHICAGO CONFERENCE

The foundation for the Chicago Conference of 1944 (the
Conference) was laid by President of the United States Franklin
D. Roosevelt. The Chicago Conference was inaugurated on November 1, 1944 with the reading of a message to the Conference
from the President. In his message, President Roosevelt (referring to the Paris Conference of 1919, which was designed to
open Europe to air traffic but unfortunately took years to be
effectively implemented) stated:
I do not believe that the world today can afford to wait several
years for its air communications. There is no reason why it
should.
Increasingly, the airplanes will be in existence. When either
the German or Japanese enemy is defeated, transport planes
should be available for release from military work in numbers
sufficient to make a beginning. When both enemies have been
defeated, they should be available in quantity. Every country has
its airports and trained pilots; and practically every country
knows how to organize airlines....
You are fortunate in having before you one of the great lessons
of history. Some centuries ago, an attempt was made to build
great empires based on domination of great sea areas. The lords
of these areas tried to close the areas to some, and to offer access
to others, and thereby to enrich themselves and extend their
power. This led directly to a number of wars both in the Eastern
and Western Hemispheres. We do not need to make that mistake again. I hope you will not dally with the thought of creating
great blocs of closed air, thereby tracing in the sky the conditions
of future wars. I know you will see to it that the air which God
gave to everyone shall not become the means of domination over
anyone.3
Thus, President Roosevelt urged States to eschew protectionism, while encouraging them to avoid dominance over one another. Ever since, the fate of economic regulation of
international air transport has been relegated to the status of an
obdurate dilemma which posed the question as to how States
could avoid dominance by others without protecting themselves.
The elusive balance between the two is still being vigorously
sought, as this article will discuss. The Chairman of the Confer3

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS

43 (1944) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].

OF THE INT'L

CIVL

AvIATION CONF., at

42-
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ence, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., endorsed the President's comments by
observing:
There are many tasks which our countries have to do together,
but in none have they a clearer and plainer common interest
than in the work of making the air serviceable to mankind. For
the air was given to all; every nation in the world has access to it.
To each nation there is now available a means of friendly intercourse with all the world, provided a working basis for that intercourse can be found and maintained.4
At the Conference, the United States took the position that
the use of the air and the use of the sea were similar in that they
were both "highway[s] given by nature to all men."5 They were
different in that use of the air is subject to the sovereignty of
nations over which such use is made.6 The United States was,
therefore, of the opinion that nations ought to arrange among
themselves for use of the air in such a manner that would "be of
the greatest benefit to all humanity, wherever situated." 7 The
United States further advocated the rule that each country has
an inalienable and unqualified sovereignty of the air which is
over its lands and its territorial waters.8 This absolute right, according to the United States, had to be qualified by the subscription by States to friendly intercourse between nations and the
universal recognition of the natural rights of States to communicate and trade with each other. This right could not be derogated by the use of discriminatory measures. 9 The fact that the
United States required States to exchange air traffic rights reciprocally is clearly evident in the statement: "It is therefore the
view of the United States, that, without prejudice to full rights of
sovereignty, we should work upon the basis of exchange of
needed privileges and permissions which friendly nations have a
right to expect from each other." 10
The privilege of communication by air with friendly countries,
according to the United States, was "not a right to wander at will
throughout the world." 1 ' In this respect, it was contended that
"traffic by air differ[ed] materially from traffic by sea, where
Id at 43.
5 Id. at 55.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 &
10 Id. at 56.
4

11 Id.
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commerce need have no direct connection with the country
from which the ship may have come". 12 The air routes were
analogous to railroad lines, and the right to connect communication links between States was to establish a steady flow of traf3
fic, thereby opening economic routes between countries.1
According to the United States, it was too early to go beyond this
concept, and States should accept the fact that what the Conference should accomplish was adoption of a Convention establishing communication between States. 4
With regard to the establishment of an international organization, the United States was of the view that in the purely technical field, considerable power could be wielded by such an
organization, while in the economic and political fields, only
consultative, fact-gathering, and fact-finding functions should be
performed. The United States concluded:
[T] he United States will support an international organization in
the realm of air commerce having power in technical matters
and having consultative functions in economic matters and the
political questions which may be directly connected with them
under a plan by which continuing and collected experience,
widening custom, and the growing maturity of its counsel may
establish such added base as circumstances may warrant for the
future consideration
of enlarging the functions of the consulta5
group.1
tive
The United Kingdom, in its statement of position, strongly advocated a plan that would provide the services needed between
States, serve the interests of the travelling public, and would be
fair between States. It was further recognized that each State

had a fair share in the operation of air services and traffic carriage, giving as an example the pre-World War II proposals by
the United Kingdom and the United States of opening a transAtlantic service on a fifty-fifty basis. 1 6 The United Kingdom further contended:
While recognizing national interests we want to encourage enterprise and efficiency which are indeed themselves a national as
well as an international interest. And we want therefore to encourage the efficient and to stimulate the less efficient. ...

13

Id.
Id.

14

Id. at 57.

12

15 Id. at 61. It is worthy of note that in 1944, the United States had envisioned

greater scope for the proposed international organization in economic issues.
16 Id. at 64-65.
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[O] nly by common action on some such lines as indicated can
we reduce and gradually eliminate subsidies, thereby putting civil
aviation on an economic footing and incidentally very considerably relieving the 17tax payer. Unrestricted competition is their
most fruitful soil.
The United Kingdom seemed to have adopted a balanced approach that supported the establishment of air services to serve
the needs of the travelling public, while not unduly affecting the
rights of States to have a fair share of air traffic for themselves.
Canada suggested the establishment of an international air
authority to plan and foster the organization of air services.
This authority would ensure that, so far as possible, international air routes and services were divided freely and equitably
between the various member States. Every State would have the
opportunity to participate in international airline operations, in
accordance with its need for air transportation service and its
industrial and scientific resources.' 8
India, while believing that it was essential for "air services to
develop rationally" with a certain degree of freedom of the air
being the inherent right of every State, went on to say:
We believe that the grant of commercial rights-that is to say,
the right to carry traffic to and from another country-is best
negotiated and agreed to on a universal reciprocal basis, rather
than by bilateral agreements. We think that only such an arrangement will secure to all countries the reciprocal rights which
their interests require. But the grant of any such freedoms and
rights must, in our opinion, necessarily be associated with the
constitution of an authority which will regulate the use Of such
freedoms. It will be the function of such authority... to ensure
that the interests of the people, both of the most powerful and of
the smaller countries, are secured.' 9
In summary, India's position has been to recommend a liberal
approach of universal reciprocity within the parameters of control by an authority that could ensure that the smaller nations
were protected from being swamped by larger States.
France also strongly supported the establishment of an inter
national organization that could act as a "watchdog" against
predatory practices by States in the operation of international
air services. In its Statement of Position, France stated:
17

Id. at 65.

is Id. at 69.
19 Id at 76.
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As the President of the United States of America recommended
yesterday in his message, we must endeavour to avoid the future
formation of rival air blocs.
To escape this danger, of which we were so justly warned, all
the nations invited here must have a reasonable share in air
transportation. The international organization, which we are to
consider, seems to us the only means of reaching this goal and of
affording to international air transportation the unlimited development to which it is entitled."0
The incontrovertible fact that emerges from the various views
discussed above is that there was a consensus that competition
for air traffic rights, based on the concept of State sovereignty,
should be fair and equitable. It is for this reason that some
States suggested the creation of an "umpire" to decide whether
fair competition was being practiced among the States.
The spirit of international civil aviation is, therefore, one of
sharing air services and giving every country an opportunity to
not only indulge in trade in air services but also to operate such
services. The United States concluded:
Worldwide development of civil aviation is a powerful force for
world unity and world peace;
A general system of rights for planes to travel and to carry international commerce should be set up, becoming the established
custom of commerce by air, as similar arrangements have become the settled law of commerce by sea;
These rights of transit and commerce should be available to all
nations, permitting equal opportunity and reasonable competition ....
1
Referring to plurilateralism or sharing the international airways
among a few nations, Adolf A. Berle, the United States delegate
to the Chicago Conference, had this to say in 1944:
It may be noted that this movement necessarily includes some of
the features of the old mercantile trading companies which became colonial empires. But it short-circuits the period within
which those huge concerns were private monopolies run for private enrichment. Moreover, it fails to answer the problems of all
peoples, unless all peoples are assigned a place in the scheme of
things. A naked division of air commerce among, let us say, Britain, the Soviet Union, China and the United States-which was
actually proposed by Senator Brewster, who is a recognized
Id at 82.
Adolf A. Berle, Freedoms of the Air, in
1 (1945).
20
21

BLUEPRINT FOR WORLD CIVIL AVIATION 1,
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spokesman for Pan American Airways in the United States Senate-necessarily means wiping all other countries out of the international air. Other countries intensely dislike the idea. What
is more, they can cite chapter and verse for their protests-the
Atlantic Charter states as one of the joint war aims of President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill: "To further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access
on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world
which are needed for their economic prosperity." This they consider a necessary premise of the following article of the Charter,
which calls for the fullest collaboration between nations in the
economic sphere, looking toward improved labour standards,
economic advancement, and social security. It is easy for critics to
assume that the advocates of economic collaboration in the airas in other fields-are merely endeavouring to find a .new form
of words to justify economic imperialism. Yet the criticism is by
no means necessarily just. Like any plan which rests on governmental power, the result will be liberation or oppression, depending on whether the plan is fair to all or whether it favours
some at the expense of others .... 2
There is a certain irony in this statement, which was made in
1944 and reflects the overall spirit of the Chicago Convention,
which includes the regulatory framework that applies to air traffic rights. There is no doubt that if air traffic rights are brought
within the purview of GATS under the overall GATT -umbrella,
the total liberalization of international air services would result.
This would, in turn, lead to free competition in the world, leaving a few mega-carriers to enjoy the total aviation market. In
this scenario, the rights of others who are edged out in the process-from operating air services for their States-would indeed be a thing of the past.
B.

Tm CHICAGO CONVENTION

Fifty-two States signed the Chicago Convention on December
7, 1944 and the Convention came into force on April 4, 1947.3
In its Preamble, the Convention records the signatory States'
agreement on certain principles and arrangements, insuring
that international civil aviation will be developed in a safe and
orderly manner, that international air transport services will be
established on the basis of equality of opportunity, and that serv22

Id. at 5.

23

Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1212, 15 U.N.T.S. at 374.
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ices will be operated soundly and economically. 24 This pronouncement blends the need for order in civil aviation with the
need for equality of opportunity and the economical operation
of air services.
As a first measure, the contracting States recognize the complete and exclusive sovereignty of every State over the air space
above its territory2 5-a preeminent tenet of international air law
26
that had been recognized from the time of the Roman Empire
and carried over to the Paris Convention of 1919.27 Each con-

tracting State agrees that the aircraft of the other, which are not
engaged in scheduled international air services, shall have the
right, subject to the observance of the terms of the Convention,
to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and
make stops for non-traffic purposes without having to obtain
permission of the grantor State for such operations. Such aircraft are also generally given the right to take on or discharge
passengers, mail, and cargo, provided that the aircraft are engaged in the carriage of such traffic and the rights of a State
28
concerned are not derogated by such operations.
The most contentious provision of the Convention relating to
commercial air transport is Article 6, which prohibits a scheduled international air service from operating air services into the
territory of a contracting State except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with
the terms of such permission or authorization. Pursuant to the
inability of the contracting States to reach multilateral agreement on uniformity in the award of air traffic rights, two agreements emerged which attempted to group States into accepting
a limited common base on commercial aviation. The first-the
Transit or Two Freedoms Agreement-was signed by thirty-two
States and permitted aircraft of those States to fly across each
others' territories or land in them for non-traffic purposes, without having to obtain permission from the grantor State. The
second-the Five Freedoms or Transport Agreement-was
Id. 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at 296.
Id.
26 For a discussion of the legal foundation of sovereignty and air traffic rights,
see Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Air Traffic Rights Debate-A Legal Study, 18-1
ANNALS AiR & SPACE L. 3, 16-20 (1993).
27 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
28 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1181-83, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298300.
24
25
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signed by twenty States and granted the free use of the Five Freedoms of the air as they are known today.29 Those States which
did not sign either of these agreements were required to sign
bilateral air services agreements if their aircraft were to operate
commercial air services into each others' territories that involved taking on or discharging passengers, mail, and cargo in
the other's territory. In addition, cabotage was introduced in
Article 7 of the Convention, which prohibits aircraft from picking up or discharging passengers, mail, and cargo destined from
one point of a State to another.
C.

POST-CHICAGO

CONVENTION

TRENDS

The economic significance of the Chicago Convention lies entirely in its main theme: meeting the global need for economical
air transport while preventing waste through unfair competition, and providing for a fair opportunity for all States to operate air services. In order to accomplish this goal, the
Convention, through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), has to consider all the economic implications
posed by the operation of international air services by commercial air transport enterprises of the world, particularly those of
the member States of ICAO.
In August 1945, at the first meeting of the Interim Council of
the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO), the Honorable C.D. Howe, Canada's Minister of Reconstruction, said: "We believe that there must be greater freedom
for development of international air transport and that this freedom may best be obtained within a framework which provides
equality of opportunity and rewards for efficiency. ' 30 Dr. Edward Warner, Representative of the United States and later the
first President of the ICAO Council, said at the same meeting:
29 See 1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAw 1 1(41), 1 IV(27) (4th ed. 1977).
Three other.freedoms of the air have been added since the Chicago Convention
was signed. The Sixth Freedom provides that an airline has the right to carry
traffic between two foreign States via its own State of registry. See PAUL S. DEMPSEY,
LAw AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 50 (1987). This freedom
can also be considered a combination of the Third and Fourth Freedoms secured
by th'e State of registry from two different States producing the same effect as the
Fifth Freedom vis-a-vis both foreign States. The Seventh Freedom allows an airline operating air services entirely outside the territory of its State of registry to fly
into the territory of anothel- State and there discharge or take on traffic coming
from, or destined for, a third State or States. The Eighth Freedom is cabotage, as
referred to in Article 7 of the Chicago Convention. Id.
30 PICAO Documents, Montreal, 1945, Volume 1, Doc 1, at 3.
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Our first purpose will be to smooth the paths for civil flying wherever we are able. We shall seek to make it physically easier, safer,
more reliable, more pleasant; but I believe it will be agreed also
that we should maintain the constant goal that civil aviation
should contribute to international harmony. The civil use of aircraft must so develop as to bring the peoples closer together,
let3 1
ting nation speak more understandingly unto nation.
Dr. Warner stressed that the purpose of civil aviation is the promotion of international harmony and dialogue between nations.
He also made it clear that the seminal task of civil aviation is to
bring, the people of the world together through understanding
and interaction. 2 It is clear that at this stage, civil aviation was
recognized more as a social necessity than a mere economic factor. In addition, through the statements of Minister Howe and
Dr. Warner, one can glean the attitude of the international community towards aviation at that time: a) that civil aviation was
based on equality of opportunity, and b) that it was a social need
rather than a fiscal tool.
The First Interim Assembly of PICAO was held in May 1946.
This session set the scene for identifying issues that had
culminated in the provisions of the Chicago Convention. After
the First Interim Assembly, PICAO commissioned a group of experts (called Commission 3) to draft a multilateral agreement
on commercial rights for aircraft. This culminated in a Draft
Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights which contained
three basic elements:
1) a grant of the right to operate commercially to a reasonable
number of traffic centers serving as conveniently as is practicable
each State's international traffic;
2) a basic regulatory provision dealing with the amount of capacity to be provided, with subsidiary provisions designed to prevent
abuses; and,
3) a provision for the settlement of differences between contracting States through arbitral tribunals with power to render
33
binding decisions.
The only provisions of the draft on which unanimous agreement
was not reached were those concerning routes, airports, and capacity. Commission 3 also inquired into the distinction between
31
32

Id Doc 2, at 2.
Id.

33 Views of Commission No. 3, Doc. 4023, A-1 - P/3, at 23-26 (Apr. 1, 1947). See
also ICAO Working Paper No. C-WP/369, at 2 (June 22, 1949) (discussing the
Commission's work on the Agreement).
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scheduled and non-scheduled services as they appeared in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention.
As a result of the Commission 3's study of scheduled and nonscheduled air transport, the Air Transport Committee, at the
Seventeenth Session of the ICAO Council in 1952, examined a
Secretariat study on regulations in international non-scheduled
aviation. The study found that national policies with respect to
the taking on or discharging of traffic in their territories by foreign non-scheduled aircraft had taken a variety of forms. Thirteen States required prior permission for each individual flight
or series of flights and the granting or denial of permission was
based on the circumstances of each individual case. Ten States
required that permission for non-scheduled flights be granted
for each flight or series of flights subject to prescribed regulations. Some States required specific bilateral agreements, while
others demanded reciprocal treatment for their carriers. 34 Five
European States made formal bilateral arrangements for the
regulation of non-scheduled commercial flights between their
territories.3 5
The Committee also noted that the Council had expressed
the view that a "stop for non-traffic purposes" as referred to in
Article 5 of the Convention should, include the freedom to load
and unload passengers or goods not carried for remuneration
or hire. The Council had also considered "remuneration or
hire" to mean something received for the act of transportation
from someone other than the operator. This interpretation
meant that flights carried out on the business of the operator
would receive the freedom granted by the first paragraph of Article 5.6 The Council's analysis of Artidle 5 also indicated that
the State flown over must not consider its right to require landing as a matter of course and that this right, as granted in the
provision, must not be exercised too restrictively. Consideration
was also given to the fact that, although the Chicago Convention, by Article 3, precludes its application to State aircraft, most
States may be prepared to agree that civilian State aircraft
should be given the type of free passage described in the first
paragraph of Article 5.7 The same right may be given to emer-

34

ICAO Working Paper No. AT-WP/295, at 5 (Dec. 15, 1952).

3

Id5

36

ICAO Working Paper No. AT-WP/296, at 9 (Dec. 15, 1952).

37

Id.
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gency operations, taxi-type flights, and all inclusive charter
tours.3 8

An analysis containing the above views of the ICAO Council,
together with a definitive report by the Council to contracting
States of scheduled international air services3 9 as referred to in
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, was adopted by Council at
its Fifteenth Session on March 28, 1952. This report contained
the fact that a scheduled international air service must, in the
first instance, consist of a series of flights.4" Thus, a single flight
by itself could not constitute a scheduled international air service. Article 6, therefore, requires that a series of flights must be
performed through the airspace over the territory of more than
one State and performed by aircraft for the transport of passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration in order to constitute a
scheduled national air service. The service must serve traffic between the same two or more points, either according to a published timetable, or with flights so regular or frequent that they
constitute a recognizably systematic series. 4 The word "remuneration" in the provision has the same application and meaning as in Article 5.
D.

THE BERMUDA AGREEMENT

In the meantime, in 1946, the United States and the United
Kingdom, as a means of compromise between the "free market"
approach of the former and the somewhat more cautious and
conservative approach of the latter, entered into a bilateral
agreement for air services between their two territories. Called
"Bermuda I," this agreement represented a compromise bitween the philosophies of the two States that had been so divergent during the Chicago Conference.42 The Bermuda I
agreement was typified by its restrictive pricing regime and liberal capacity arrangements and route descriptions. The United
Id. at 10.
The ICAO Assembly, at its Second Session held in Geneva in June 1948,
adopted Resolution A2-18 which called for the adoption by the Council of a definition of "scheduled international air service." See Resolutions and Recommendations of the Assembly, Res. A2-18, at 79-80, ICAO Doc. 7670 (1956).
38
39

40

Id.

See Definition of a Scheduled InternationalAir Service, at 3, ICAO Doc. 7278
.(Mar. 25, 1952).
42 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Ber.
muda I].
41
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States compromised in the agreement by withdrawing its opposition to the international regulation of fares and agreed that primary fare-setting functions should devolve upon the
International Air Transport Association (IATA). The United
Kingdom, in turn, agreed to retract its earlier position that capacity should be regulated and recognized that airlines should
be allowed to regulate capacity by determining their frequency
on a given route, provided that governments were the ultimate
arbiters of the control of capacity on the routes that were relevant to their territories. Accordingly, Bermuda I determined
that capacity should bear a strong and close relationship to the
requirements of the public for air transport.43
As a result of the attendant dichotomy between liberalization
on the one hand and protectionism on the other, States were
impelled to couch their positions on commercial air traffic
rights in the words of Article 6 of the Convention, thereby inhibiting their carriers' commercial freedom to operate air services
wherever they considered it profitable without first obtaining
permission from the grantor State. In other words, protectionism had won out over liberalization. A corollary to this debate
was the polarization of two groups of States, one of which required capacity to be controlled and the other which required
tariffs to be subject to some degree of control. The resultant
agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom
also provided a model bilateral air services agreement for States
which defined the Five Freedoms of the air, brought capacity
control between two points under the purview of the air carriers
concerned (subject to the approval of their States), and gave the
task of tariff-setting to the IATA.
For nearly thirty years following its conclusion, many other
States followed the Bermuda model in their air services agreements. One of the advantages of the Bermuda model has been
recognized as the IATA tariff-setting clause" which achieved a
certain multilateralism through bilateralism. One of the main
disadvantages of the Bermuda model has been that it gave governments a basis to formulate their civil aviation policies and
sometimes adopt an unduly restrictive stance on their sovereignty in airspace, frequently leading States to withdraw air traffic rights enjoyed by airlines. Due to this significant
43 Id. 60 Stat. at 1515.
44 Id. 60 Stat. at 1504.
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shortcoming, Bermuda I collapsed, predictably, after thirty
years.45
One of the ways in which the international aviation community attempted to circumvent the veneer of absolute protectionism reflected in Article 6 of the Chicago Convention was by
introducing the concept of fair and equal opportunity to the
Bermuda principles. According to this principle, each bilateral
air service agreement between two States, if it follows the Bermuda pattern, should include a clause which provides that there
shall be fair and equal opportunity for the designated airlines of
both contracting parties to operate the agreed air services on
the specific routes between their respective territories.
In operating the agreed services, the airlines of each contracting party are required to take into account the interests of
the airlines of the other contracting party, so as not to affect
unduly the services which the latter provide on the same routes.
The factors taken into account in ensuring fair and equal opportunity for each carrier are: a) the requirements of the public for
transportation on the same routes; and b) the capacity, at a rea46
sonable load factor, that each carrier may offer.
In addition to emphasizing fair and equal opportunity for
each carrier, the air services agreement also insists that no carrier should unduly affect the operation of air services of the
other.4 7 Capacity determination at a reasonable load factor to
fulfill the requirements of the public is usually a requirement,
although the main thrust of the clause is to ensure that some
protection is afforded to the carrier which is less fortunate than
the other, so that both carriers obtain a fair deal on their operations on the same route. Therefore, it is arguable that all operational factors have to be taken into consideration so that one
carrier does not unduly affect the operations of the other.
While the fair and equal opportunity clause has always been
shrouded in a fog of rhetoric, the capacity considerations have
underscored the meaning and purpose of the provision. This
45 Bermuda II, which was signed in 1977, contained a system of multiple
designation of airlines by one State and other liberal provisions that toned down
the harshness of capacity and route designation of its predecessor. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning
Air Services, July 23, 1977, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 28 U.S.T. 5368 [hereinafter Bermuda
H].
46 Id. 28 U.S.T. at 5378.
47 Id. 28 U.S.T. at 5377.
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approach has often caused pre-determination of capacity to be
considered the primary objective of the provision. Insistence by
most contracting States on capacity as the sole criterion in the
interpretation of the fair and equal opportunity clause has rendered developing nations unable to inaugurate new air routes
and develop or utilize already existing ones. Besides, capacity is
always determined by uncorroborated statistics of uplift and discharge of passengers, mail, and cargo which are furnished by
both parties to the bilateral agreement. It is often expected that
these statistics would oppose each other diametrically. Therefore, incontrovertibly, capacity consideration has now inveigled
itself as an effective tool into the hands of any contracting State
which does not intend to grant air traffic rights to another on a
given route.
Needless to say, this unfortunate consideration has left some
States in a hapless situation, destitute of any bargaining ability.
In addition to the fact that capacity statistics can seldom be authenticated, the parochial vision reflected in the pre-determination of capacity has indeed perverted the purpose for which the
fair and equal opportunity clause was introduced by the Bermuda principles.
E.

THE ROLE OF ICAO

ICAO was established on April 4, 1947. The first ICAO Assembly in 1947 followed up on the development of a Multilateral
Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Civil Air
Transport that was commenced by PICAO. At this assembly, the
United Kingdom felt that certain general principles should govern route agreements. 4 The concern of the United States was
that in matters of frequencies, capacity route exchanges, and
Fifth Freedom traffic rights, there would be disorder in operating on a general multilateral basis.4 9 At this meeting, the delegate of Canada analyzed the reason for seeking multilateralism
in air services by stating:
So we looked at the matter basically and said, "Why do we want
Multilateralism?" and the feeling that I had, speaking for Canada, was not that we wanted uniformity, although that is desirable, in as much as I see no end result in uniformity for its own
sake. We had a much loftier purpose in mind, and that was the
48 Development of a Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International

Civil Air Transport,at 12-13, ICAO Doc. 4510, AI-EC/72 (May 1947).
49 Id at 23.
'
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idea of creating a set of conditions that all nations who wanted to
fly could use so that they would know in advance what their opportunities were, what the conditions were that they would be up
against, so that it would not be possible for one nation to discriminate against another, and grant to another nation privileges that
they would not be willing to grant to others equally entitled to
them, so that these things would not lead to friction between nations and quarrels and eventually be the seed from which might
spring a war. For this reason, it was said we wanted multilateral50
ism, not merely uniform clauses.
The views of the developing world were placed before the assembly by the delegate of Peru:
The Multilateral Agreement is a high ideal for which we have
already fought and must continue to [fight], but a firm fighting
spirit should not allow eagerness to obscure reality. The latter, as
we Peruvians see it, places grave difficulties in the way of an absolute and universal multilateral agreement. Those difficulties emanate from the different stages of development in commercial
aviation among the various nations, from the different aeronautical potential of each country, from the variations found when
considering each country... in international air transport, according to its climatic or geographical conditions and lastly, what
is more important, the substantial differences between the countries already in commercial aeronautics, and these countries,
such as ours, which can only look to the future. 5 '
The ICAO Assembly, at its Second Session held in Geneva in
June 1948, adopted Resolution A2-16 which called for further
action on a Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights and
resolved that contracting States study and consider the above
elements.

5 2

III.
A.

Tm

RECENT TRENDS

AIR TRANSPORT CoLLOQuIUM

On a decision taken by the ICAO Council on June 11, 1991, a
World-Wide Air Transport Colloquium was held at ICAO from
April 6 to April 10, 1992. The Colloquium discussed the
strengths and weaknesses of the bilateral system; possible complementary and alternative multilateral regulatory structures; air
service regulatory relationships between groupings of States on
5o Id. at 35.
51 Id. at 45-46.
52 Resolutions and Recommendations of the Assembly, Res. A2-16, at 78, ICAO Doc.

7670 (1956).
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the one hand and between individual States and groupings of
States on the other; the applicability or inapplicability to air
transport of international trade concepts (which are also elements of air transport) such as market access, non-discrimination, transparency, and increasing participation of developing
States; foreign and multinational ownership of national airlines;
and nationality of aircraft and access to domestic traffic by foreign airlines."
The overall commercial considerations of the Colloquium
such as market access, foreign and multinational ownership of
airlines, transparency, non-discrimination, and cabotage were
directly or indirectly linked with the award of air traffic rights to
airlines, which was the primary concern of the Colloquium. At
the conclusion of the Colloquium, there appears to have been
the general view that caution should be applied in considering a
multilateral approach to the award of air traffic rights. The positive aspects of a bilateral system were identified as:
1. its capacity to fill a multilateral void;
2. its symbiosis with the multilateral system of airline cooperation that exists now;
3. the ability of bilateralism to provide much of the legal basis
for the world's international air transportation system;
4. the way in which it applies fair and equal opportunity for the
airlines of negotiating States;
5. the high degree of protection that the bilateral system offers
national airlines of all nations of the world;
6. the manner in which bilateralism appears to protect weaker
-airlines against their more powerful foreign competitors; and
7. the way in which the bilateral system of negotiation for air
traffic rights has created a regulatory system that treats international air transport as special among service industries. 4

The disadvantages of the bilateral system were identified as:
1. the way in which it is being challenged by many who believe
air transport is not special;
2. the perceived disadvantages that the system imposes upon airports (which presumably lose valuable revenue when air services
are restricted by bilateral negotiations), cities and consumers, in
particular by imposing regulatory limitations on growth and

opportunity;
53 ICAO NEws RELEASE, ICAO Council to Convene World-Wide Air Transport Colloquium, (ICAO, Montreal, Can.), Sept. 1991, at 1.
54 ICAO Working Paper No. WATC-5.1, at 1 (Apr. 6, 1992).
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3. the manner in which, arguably, the system has not always
adapted to changing market and political systems;
4. the fact that costs are incurred in maintaining the bilateral
system as opposed to a free market system which would run by
itself; and
5. the proliferation of bilateral agreements that airlines have to
contend with in the operation of their air services. 5 5
Among the advantages of a multilateral system was its rapid
popularity growth among some nations owing to its timely emergence in a period of rapid transnationalization of ownership
and globalization in service industries. Multilateralism was also
commended by some as a proposed path to liberalization of the
air services agreement It was also represented as a system that
would better serve the fiscal interests of airports, while giving
the consumer a wider choice of product.5 6 The disadvantages of
multilateralism were, however, multifarious:
1. a consensually acceptable global multilateral structure has yet
to be designed, and even if it is eventually designed, it may not
succeed in protecting national carriers and ensuring their continued presence in the international scene;
2. a multilateral system may not be able to ensure fully adequate
air service links for all concerned States;
3. there is consensus that a multilateral air services structure has
to be approached very cautiously, making it unforeseeable in the
near future;
4. multilateralism may not be a complete replacement for existing bilateral arrangements between some States at least, thus
requiring a dual structure to exist side by side; and
5. a multilateral structure would be very difficult (if not impossible) to design, in view of the many safeguards that are built in to
57
the bilateral air services agreement at present.
Although the Colloquium emerged, as expected, as a forum
for collecting points of view of experts in the field, it did not
align itself either way-towards bilateralism or multilateralism.5 s
B.

POST-COLLOQUIUM TRENDS

The role of ICAO in furthering and implementing the economic goals of the Chicago Convention, including the efficient
55 Id.
56 Id. at

2.

57 Id.
58 For a detailed discussion of the Colloquium, see Abeyratne, supra note 26, at
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and thorough manner in which the Organization executed its
objectives, was one of the significant features brought out by the
Colloquium. The Avmark Aviation Economist reported immediately after the conclusion of the meeting:
ICAO's Secretariat had taken much trouble to try to focus the
delegates' thinking on the relevant topics, maintain quality in the
debate and avoid the long political ramblings that tend to
characterise meetings attended by government representatives.
The comprehensive background material provided included
long lists of questions that needed answering, compilations of expert views on the subjects, definitions and examples illustrating
the key concepts, excerpts from relevant pieces of legislation,
and details of agreements, industry groupings and
organizations.5 9
Some of the recent bilateral air services negotiations illuminate
the present thinking on the debate relating to multilateralism,
plurilateralism, and bilateralism. For example, the United
States and the United Kingdom have made known the philosophy behind their air transport policies:
The aim . .. is to replace the restrictions in the current air services agreement with a regine that enables airline managements
to determine the price and supply of air services .... Both governments want to see vigorous but fair competition, offering
the
60
public an even wider choice of airlines, routes and fares.
Immediately after this statement was made, however, talks between the States ended in a deadlock because the United Kingdom was negotiating to lift curbs on foreign ownership of
United States airlines and the United States had sought free access to London's Heathrow Airport before it would give any
more concessions to British carriers such as Virgin Atlantic and
British Airways.6'
Contemporaneously, a similar situation had developed between the United States and Japan, when Japan required that
the bilateral agreement with the United States be reworked so
that the marketplace capacity and extensive rights enjoyed by
the American carriers were curtailed. Japan contended that bilateral agreements should reflect market conditions accurately
59 Heini Nuutinen, The Tortuous Path to Plurilateralism,AvMAmm AVIATION ECON1992, at 14, 17.
A. Shifrin, U.S., UK Seek New Air Services Pact,AvIATION WE. & SPACE
TECH., Apr. 26, 1993, at 30.
61 Dan Reed, American, Delta Belittle British Official's Route Offer, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, June 12, 1993, at 1.
OMIST, May
6 Carole
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and claimed that American carriers had a far greater share of
the United States-Japan capacity and operated far more flights
beyond Japan than can be justified by the demand for travel by
Americans to the Asia-Pacific region.6"
The debate over whether air traffic rights should be under a'
liberal trading environment or whether the present system of
regulation should prevail goes on, despite the regular leaning by
both the developed and developing world towards regulation
and protectionism. This was evident at a gathering of senior aviation officials of the world in June 1993, where Singapore Airlines strongly urged the United States to lead the effort to bring
about a more liberal aviation trading environment through the
gradual building of a multilateral regime, only to be opposed
vigorously by Air France. 63 A commentator has independently.
observed:
One commentator described the differences that undermined efforts to arrive at a multilateral air transport agreement at 'Chicago as follows: "While the U.S. delegation sought to use a
multilateral convention essentially to 'codify' a free market ethic,
other nations saw a multilateral agreement as a way to ensure
that the robust U.S. airline industry would not monopolize international ciil aviation." This comment equally describes the situation today. Then, as now, the different degrees of economic
development and associated economic policies of countries
make it unrealistic to expect agreement on a universal set of
rules to govern international air transport.64
Against this environment, ICAO initiated its Fourth Air Transport Conference to be held in late 1994 at ICAO Headquarters
in Montreal. ICAO appointed the Study Group of Experts on
Regulatory Arrangements for International Transport (GEFRA),
which assisted the ICAO Secretariat with preparations for the
Conference. In 1993, twelve GEFRA members, representing
government, air carrier, and airport expertise from all regions
of the world, undertook a comprehensive exploration of seven
topics that would be discussed and analyzed at the Conference.
62

305.
63

JAL Wants Overhaul of U.S.-Japan Bilatera AVIATION DAILY, May 25, 1993, at
U.S., Foreign CEOs Debate Future of InternationalAviation, AviATION DAILY, June

4, 1993, at 358.

64 Bruce Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The Prosepcts for Futher Liberalization of
Trade in InternationalAirTransport Services, 57J. AIR L. & CoM. 599, 639-40 (1992)
(quoting L. Gilles Sion, MultilateralTransportAgreements Reconsidered: The Possibility
of a Regional Agreement Among North Atlantic States, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 155, 174

(1981)).
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The Air Transport Conference would examine the core issues
identified and analyzed by the GEFRA Group in its role as a
"trailblazer" in commercial aviation. Its main consideration has
been succinctly expressed by the President of the ICAO Council:
Today, as we stand at the crossroads and see but dimly the avenues which may be opening up to us, we must decide what our
attitude is to be towards preparing adequately for change. There
are but two possibilities. One is to take a protective stance, to
sink roots even deeper into familiar soil, yet to risk ultimately
being uprooted as the world continues to change all around us.
The other possibility is a dynamic one: it is to trust human creativity and to employ it to the fullest and in a cooperative way to
bring about a better future.6 5

C.

THE WORLD-WIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE

As a result of a review of the findings of the Colloquium, the
ICAO Council decided in June 1992 that there was a compelling
need to explore new regulatory arrangements for international
air transport in the form of an air transport conference. Since a
period of intensive examination of international air transport
regulation in the 1940s after the Chicago Conference was convened, ICAO had held only three air transport conferences in
1977, 1980 and 1985, respectively. Those conferences were by
no means comprehensive in their deliberations and had only
addressed specific issues at each conference. In order to ensure
adequate preparation for the fourth air transport conference,
which was scheduled by the Council for December 1994, the
Secretary General of ICAO was requested to establish a study
group of experts on future regulatory arrangements for air
transport (GEFRA). This group was established in September
1992.
At the twenty-ninth session of the ICAO Assembly in September and October 1992, the South American States submitted
that, since the signing of the Chicago Convention in 1944, international air transport had not been regulated from a commercial standpoint, which had led to fundamental changes in the
present structure of the air transport industry, which was influenced by unilateral decisions taken by one State or groups ,of
States. Accordingly, there was a compelling need to establish a
Assad Kotaite, New Regulatory Concepts Expected to Emerge at Worldwide Conference Late Next Year, ICAO J., May 1993, at 20, 21.
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new set of rules governing international air transport.6 6 The
South American States claimed that such a need was strongly felt
in the prevailing environment of mega-carriers and computer
reservations macro-systems within a concept of globalization in
the marketing and presentation of international air transport
services. 6 7 The proposing States expressed the wish that the new
regulatory structure should address the following:
a) a new international airline profile (legal, economic, operative
and administrative);
b) bases for the designation of airlines, taking into account the
corporate structure (company mergers, integration of markets);
c) new criteria on substantial ownership and effective control of
airlines, as a function of their designation;
d) new ideas with respect to traffic rights;
e) new principles related to non-scheduled flights and charter
flights; and
f) elaboration of a code of conduct on commercial
competition.68
It was further wished that the above issues be discussed extensively in a forum chosen by the States, whether through an Extraordinary Assembly with powers to issue resolutions or
through an air transport conference with limited competence,
not later than 1994, in order to establish the bases for interna69
tional air transport in the third millennium.
The Economic Commission of the Assembly, while recognizing that there was support for the general proposal above, was in
favor of the latter proposal-that a conference, adequately prepared, be convened in the latter part of 1994.70 The meaning
and purpose of the conference was succinctly summed up in a
recent commentary:
[T] he initiative to organize a conference where the future of economic regulation will be the central focus is not only a laudable
,idea but a logical one following the WATC (World Air Transport
Colloquium), the ongoing economic liberalization policies and
developments within and outside the air transport sector. The
conference is not intended to establish binding legal decisions
nor amend the Chicago Convention but merely to exchange
ICAO Working Paper No. A 29-WP/163, EX/49 EC/38, at 1 (Sept. 30,
1992).
67

Id. at 3.

68 Id

at 2.

69 Id. at 4.
70 ICAO Working Paper No. A 29-Min EC/4, at 3 (Oct. 3, 1992).
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ideas on the impact of macro-,and micro-level developments on
the economic regulation of international air transportation. 71
D.

SOME INTERIM GLOBAL ISSUES

In early 1993, Sir Colin Marshall of British Airways reportedly
confirmed the willingness of the airline to support deregulation
and global partnerships that would increase British Airways' access to the principal markets of the world.72 At the same time,
the bilateral air services agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States was being renegotiated, with the
United States claiming that the agreement was unfair to the
United States. 73 Earlier, the Canadians .had made a similar observation against the United States, because the air services
agreement for scheduled air services between Canada and the
United States gave rise to transborder air services on eightythree city pairs of which Canadian operators operated exclusively on twenty-six routes and U.S. carriers operated exclusively
on thirty-five. An official Canadian report claimed that one of
the reasons for the imbalance in market shares was the imbalance in the number of bilateral routes awarded to the airlines of
each country and certain structural competitive advantages that
had enabled U.S. carriers to maintain their dominance and improve their market shares. 4
Meanwhile, in the Asia-Pacific region, a three-cornered dispute had erupted wherein Australia had sought independent international arbitration on its air transport agreement with the
United States and the- air services agreement between the
United States andJapan, claiming that the exercise of Fifth Freedom traffic rights by U.S. carriers between Sydney and Tokyo
gave those carriers an unfair commercial advantage.75 Concerns
were reportedly being expressed by Hong Kong, Japan,. and
,South Korea on an alleged imbalance of the exercise of Fifth
Freedom traffic rights by U.S. carriers in their favor. 76 These
71 B.D.K. Henaku, ICAO: Fourth Air Transport Conference, An Examination of the

Underlying Objectives, GERMAN J. AIR & SPACE L. [ZLW], Sept. 1994, at 247, 256.
72 Sir Colin: U.S., British Must "Turn Back" Growing Protectionist Tide, WORLD AIRLINE NEws, Apr. 26, 1993, at 3.
73 See Pena Urged to Curb Major's Dominance, INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, Apr. 20,
1993, at 2.
74 Open Skies: Meeting the Challenge, Report of the Special Committee on CanadaUnited States Air Transport Services, Jan. 1991, HousE OF COMMONS, Canada, at 7.
75 Michael Westlake, Loads of Problems, FAR E. EcoN. REv. 36 (1994).
76 Passage of Rights, FLIGHT INT'L, Apr. 21, 1993, at 3.
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concerns emerged at a time when the French had already renounced their air services agreement with the United States,
and Japan had restricted Fifth Freedom traffic rights for U.S.
carriers.77 In the same region, the single Australian aviation
market in which both Australia and New Zealand participated
was terminated by Australia on the grounds that New Zealand
had benefited unequally from the total liberalization of the ex78
ercise of air traffic rights between the two countries.
The Airline Commission appointed by President Clinton of
the United States, at its hearings in June 1993, agreed "that the
bilateral system of international aviation agreements had run its
course but . . . found no consensus on what sort of regime
should succeed it."79 It was generally the opinion of the Com-

mission that the emergence of strong airline alliances would finally break the back of the bilateral system. Avmark Aviation
Economist has since examined this view with interest and observed that the growth in cross-border investment and strategic
alliances, helped by the lifting of foreign ownership restrictions,
will make the bilateral negotiating process obsolete. The growth
of multinational airlines would, according to the Avmark study,
make it hard for government negotiators to know whose interests they were supposed to represent.8 0
Contemporaneously, the Comit6 des Sages of the European
Community stressed the need for the European Community to
adopt a common external aviation policy by June 30, 1995 that
would deal with non-European States and airlines. The proposed policy would, in the eyes of the ComitE, dispel concerns
about discriminatory treatment while forming a basis for increased reciprocal market access across Europe. The Comit6
hastened to add that such a policy should be in consonance with
77 Pena Hints at Action Against France,Japan, INTERAViA AIR LETTER, Apr. 23,
1993, at 2; see alsoJAL Wants Overhaul of U.S.-JapanBilatera supra note 62, at 305
(reporting that Japan Airlines had claimed that the air services agreement between the United States and Japan had to be restructured as it awarded an unequally higher market share to U.S. carriers on the United States-Japan route);
U.S. Moves Towards Open Skies, INruRAvIA AIR LETTER, Jan. 18, 1994, at 3 (Cathay
Pacific accused the United States of calling for liberalization of air traffic rights
from Asian carriers while maintaining protectionism in the U.S. market).
78 See New Zealand Seeks to Resolve Australia Dispute, AIR LETTER, Nov. 8, 1994, at
1; see also Australia, New Zealand End Plansfor Open Skies, AIR LETTER, Nov. 14,
1994, at 1.
79 Airline Commission Debates International Strategies, AVIATION DAILY, June 25,
1993, at 479.
80 Heini Nuutinen, Bermuda 3-Or the End of Bilateralism, AvMARK AVIATION
ECONOMIST, May 5, 1993, at 7.
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the provisions of the Chicago Convention and any decisions
taken within the purview of ICAO.
Recognizing that it was not possible to annul bilateral air services agreements of member States and adopt a common multilateral policy, the Comit6 suggested that a step-by-step external
policy with the following requisites be examined:
a) transparency of all bilateral air services agreements;
b) preservation of all existing traffic rights of bilateral air services agreements;
c) ensuring compatibility of provisions of new air services agreements with Community legislation; and
d) establishment of a policy for discussion with non-European
Community8 2States as to modalities of a new multilateral external
agreement.
The overall principles of the policy are expected to achieve a
liberal aviation trading regime; be consistently applied to all
non-European Community States; be phased over a number of
years; and provide the basis of cooperation in the application of
competition rules and other conditions for doing business.8"
Just before the commencement of the ICAO World-Wide Air
Transport Conference, the United States made public its new
international aviation policy establishing free trade in aviation
services with nine unidentified European nations. In addition,
under the new policy, the United States proposes to renew efforts to liberalize existing bilateral agreements with- the United
Kingdom and Canada and seek unrestricted market-based
agreements with any country that could offer "strategic benefits"
to the U.S. carriers.84 The new policy, although not a new strategy, requires the United States to enhance existing bilateral air
services agreements and defend vigorously its existing bilateral
rights. It also recognizes that most States may not be willing to
exchange air traffic rights untrammelled. The new policy also
promotes phased liberalization of air traffic rights with any State
prepared to enter into such agreements with the United States
and seeks the strengthening of aviation relationships of the
81 Europe's "Wise Men": Bilaterals Ignore "New Realities" of Single Market, AVIATION
DAILY, Feb. 17, 1994, at 275.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 276.
84 See DOT Secretary Pena Sets Out New InternationalAviation Policy, AViATION
DAiLY, Nov. 2, 1994, at 179.
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United States in new growth
areas such as South America, Asia,
85
and Central America.

E.

OBJECTIvEs

OF THE CONFERENCE

GEFRA assisted the ICAO Secretariat throughout the preparatory stage of the Conference. After the Colloquium, the twelve
GEFRA members, representing government, air carrier, and airport expertise from all regions of the world, undertook a comprehensive exploration of present regulation, future regulatory
content, and future regulatory process and structure. The deliberation of future regulatory content involved the following
subjects:
a) Objectives: the basic goals of States against which possible
new regulatory arrangements for. the future can be evaluated.
GEFRA saw these objectives as participation(the reliable and sus-

tained involvement by a State in the international air transport
system); adaptation (the adjustment of air transport regulation to
the broader dynamic environment in which international air
transport operates); enhancement (the growth and improvement
in the quantity and quality of the international air services received by a State to and from its territory for the benefit of users,
service providers, communities and others); simplification (the
elimination of complex and detailed management that characterizes most existing regulatory arrangements, with the resultant
reduction of time and monetary costs to governments, service
providers and users); and, flexibility (the design of new regulatory
arrangements for international air transport in ways that permit
air carriers to maximize opportunities).6
b) Market access: route rights (e.g., points of origin, intermediate stop, destination, beyond points); traffic rights (e.g., for Fifth
Freedom and "Sixth Freedom" traffic, connecting/stopover traffic, cabotage); operational rights (air carrier designation and aircraft use, e.g., dry and wet leases, blocked space, code sharing,
change of gauge, intermodal).8
c) Air carrier ownership and control: Ownership and control criteria for licensing of foreign-designated air carriers and their possible elimination, replacement or modification; implications of
privatization; inward (foreign) investment in national air carriers
and the right of establishment; nationality of aircraft. 8
85 Id.
86

See SeminarProgrammeof the World-Wide Air TransportConference on International

Air Transport Regulation: Preent and Future, at Attachment 2 (Oct. 25, 1994).
87
88

Id.
Id.
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d) Safeguards: need, nature and purposes (price/capacity/,
other); elements, forms,and specific kinds (including dispute resolution mechanisms); participation of developing countries."9
e) Structural impediments: Subsidies and other State aids; physical restraints on access (slot allocation). 9"
f) The broader regulatory environment: the need to relate air
transport regulation to competition laws (including impacts on
tariff co-ordination/interlining); environmental laws; taxes on
air traffic; trade agreements and arrangements. 91
g) "Doing business" matters: Air carrier ground handling arrangements at airports; currency conversion and remittance of
earnings; non-national personnel; and the sale, marketing, and
distribution of air service products, including distribution
through computer reservation systems.92
Future regulatory process and structure involved the consideration of ways in which States can interact and the kinds of agreements they can reach bilaterally, especially between a State and
a group of States (or between two groups of States) and in their
ongoing quest for multilateralism in the global regulation of
commercial air transport services. 93
The GEFRA exercise proved to be a comprehensive exploration of new regulatory arrangements applicable to the many subjects and areas now covered by air transport agreements. Some
of the more notable subjects relating to air traffic rights that
were examined by GEFRA we'e market access (route, operational and traffic rights), progressive liberalization (phased approaches to the introduction of new regulatory arrangements),
and the need for safeguards to prevent or react to specific instances of unfair competition, as well as a "safety net" to ensure
continuing participation in the air transport system. The Group
also examined two "structural impediments"-State aids or subsidies to airlines, and physical limitations (at airports) to market
access-in terms of possible new regulatory arrangements which
would ensure that neither of these impediments would adversely
affect competition or market access. The group also considered
a regulatory process and structure for the future (the ways in
which States could interact and the kinds of agreements they
89 Id.
90

Id.

91 Id.
92

See ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/1, at 1 (May 13, 1994).

9 Id. at 2.
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can reach bilaterally, especially between a State and a group of
States or between two groups of States).
In the backdrop of the GEFRA work, it was expected that the
ICAO World-Wide Air Transport Conference would harmonize
the elements of liberalization and regulation to adapt to the
needs of change within the air transport industry. In an information paper published in the ICAOJournalprior to the Conference, Dr. Assad Kotaite, President of the ICAO Council,
succinctly summed up the spirit of the Conference:
What both regional regulation and more broadly based multilateralism share is a focus on liberalization. Whether we wish to
confront it, embrace it or merely adjust to it, liberalization will be
at the very core of regulatory change. Yet nowhere has liberalization taken place by the elimination of regulation. Rather, liberalization has occurred with changes to regulation: changes best
undertaken or accommodated with adequate preparation.94
Although international air transport is a vibrant, high-technology and capital-intensive service industry that has grown and expanded rapidly for the past fifty years with a well-designed legal
and economic regulatory and industrial framework as set down
in the Chicago Convention, it was being held at a time of grave
financial concern for the air transport industry. Although overcapacity and depressed yields in markets, increasing costs of participation, disparity in resources, and growing infrastructural
constraints and costs were some of the more significant factors
that had caused difficult times for the air transport industry,
there was also uncertainty and complexity in many aviation relations between States. These problems were further compounded by widespread. concerns about the .future direction
and stability of both the regulatory and operating environment
and the evolving structural changes in the industry. There were
compelling external forces such as increasing competition,
globalization of the world economy, transnationalization of business, privatization of service industries, regionalization, and liberalization (including a reduction in many countries in the
regulation of service industries) which had already brought to
bear a perceived effect on regulatory approaches to international air transport. The Conference had the daunting task of
focusing on the tools or regulatory content needed for a less
restricted industry in an increasingly competitive global environ94

Kotaite, supra note 65, at 21.
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ment, in conformity with the general trends of changing regulatory needs of most other service industries. 5
The task of the Conference was therefore to review the present regulatory content of international air transport, examine
and discuss proposed future regulatory arrangements as contained in the subjects examined by GEFRA, and consider future
regulatory processes and structures. It was then required to consolidate conclusions and development of recommendations on
further action by ICAO, by States, or by both.96 It was hoped
that this process would enable' States to use some of the conclusions of the conference immediately, while the ICAO Council
could either publish or otherwise disseminate a consolidated
recommendation that could be developed from these recommendations, or, in the alternative, undertake a further study or
other action that would facilitate progress in the further consideration of future regulatory arrangements in international air
97
transport.
F.

EXAMINATION OF ISSUES

The Conference recognized that the present system of economic regulation of international air transport was a corollary to
the failure to achieve a widely accepted and comprehensive multilateral agreement on the exchange of economic rights at the
Chicago Conference of 1944. The corresponding absence of
regulatory provisions for multilateral regulation of market access of air transport in the Chicago Convention had led to the
evolution over many years of a system of bilateral regulation of
air traffic rights. The Conference had therefore to consider
both the status quo and the rapidly changing environment for
commercial air transport. One of the most significant issues facing commercial aviation under the bilateral system of negotiation was the resultant imbalance in the distribution of
international traffic.
As an example, the Conference considered the statistics which
reflected that, with respect to international passengers (scheduled and non-scheduled) embarked and disembarked at airports in 1993, twenty-five airports in seventeen countries
accounted for forty-four percent of the total international passengers embarked and disembarked at over 1000 airports in 182
95
96

See ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/4, at 1-3 (May 13, 1994).
Id. at 5.

97 Id.
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countries. In terms of tons of international cargo loaded and
unloaded at airports, fifteen airports in twelve countries accounted for fifty percent of the total amount of international
cargo loaded and unloaded worldwide. 9s Thirty air carriers
from twenty-five countries accounted over the same year for seventy-six percent of total international passenger-kilometers performed worldwide by 365 air carriers. The market share of the
largest thirty carriers had increased slightly over a ten-year period between 1982 and 1993, while the market share of the ten
largest carriers had increased by two percent. This tendency toward concentration of international passenger services in a few
air carriers also manifested itself in international cargo, where
thirty scheduled service air carriers from twenty-six States were
responsible for the carriage of seventy-five percent of the total
ton-kilometers performed in 1993.19 Many air carriers had concluded bilateral agreements relating to special commercial arrangements, such as those relating to code sharing, pooling,
block space, yield management, and schedule coordination,
making themselves stronger in the marketplace. These arrangements, although able to strengthen existing commercial potential of air carriers, would also be calculated. to obtain for them
indirect market access, thus causing concern among those air
carriers who depended entirely on their bilateral air services
agreements for the carriage of commercial traffic between
States.
Another consideration that influenced the deliberations of
the Conference was the ICAO traffic forecast up to the year
2003. According to this forecast, total world airline scheduled
passenger traffic in terms of passenger-kilometers is expected to
grow at an annual rate of 5% from 1992 to 2003, compared with
5.6% per annum from 1982 to 1992.100 Freight traffic growth
over the same period is forecast to be stronger, at 6.5% per annum in terms of freight ton-kilometers. International traffic is
expected to continue to grow faster than total traffic at 6.5% per
annum for'passenger-kilometers and 7% per annum for freight
ton-kilometers.' a Over the period from 1992 to 2003, the annual total number of domestic and international aircraft departures on scheduled services is forecast to rise by nearly a quarter
98 ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/5, at 5 (Aug. 8, 1994).
I0o ICAO Sees Falloff in World Air Traffic Growth Through 2003, WORLD
NEws, Oct. 24, 1994, at 3.

101 Id.

AIRLINE

824

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

(to 18 million), the number of passengers carried by over half
(to 1.8 billion) and the number of freight tons carried also by

10 2
over a half (to 27 million).

One of the proposed future regulatory arrangements at the
Conference was that parties would grant each other full market
access (unrestricted route, operational, and traffic) rights for
use by designated air carriers, with cabotage and so-called Seventh Freedom rights exchanges optional. Of course, each party
would have the right to impose a time-limited capacity freeze as
an extraordinary measure and in response to a rapid and significant decline in that party's participation in a country pair market. The latter measure, called the "safety net," was intended to
form a buffer against a total swing towards favoring unregulated
commercial operations of air carriers. The market access and
"safety net" principle was designed to award to each party's air
carrier unrestricted basic market access rights to the other
party's territories (1) for services touching the territories of both
parties (to the exclusion of cabotage rights, i.e., rights to operate commercial air services within points in the territory of another party); (2) optionally, for so called Seventh Freedom
services (i.e., services touching the territo'ry of the granting party
without touching theterritory of the designating party); and (3)
optionally, with cabotage rights. To these rights, the "safety net'
warned that each party would have the right to impose a capacity freeze as an extraordinary measure, under six conditions that
called for such a freeze. They were:
a) to be implemented only in response to a rapid and significant
decline in that party's participation in a country pair market;
b) to be applied to all scheduled and non-scheduled fights by
the air carriers of each party and any third State which directly
serve the affected country-pair market;
c) to be intended to last for a maximum finite period of, for
example, one year, two years, or one year, renewable once;
d) to require close monitoring by the parties to enable them to
react jointly to relevant changes in the situation (for example, an
unexpected surge in traffic);
e) to be responsible for creating a situation in which any affected party may employ an appropriate dispute resolution
mechanism to identify and seek to correct any underlying problem; and

102
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f) to be aimed at requiring mutual efforts to ensure the earliest
possible correction of the problem and removal of the freeze."'
It is worthy of note that the above framework of future regulatory arrangements was intended to function in different structures and relationships, for example, bilaterally between two
States, between a State and a group of States, between two
groups of States, and multilaterally with a small or large number
of States. It was expected that this structure would also respect
10 4
all rights, existing and newly granted.
G.

POSITIONS OF STATES

There were some States and groups of States which made
their positions on the traffic rights issue known at the Conference. Some African States, while observing that the current participation of developing States in international air transport was
marginal with no foreseeable improvement in the future, maintained that Africa's position reflected a downward trend in market access in respect of African carriers. To improve the status
quo, the African States suggested that new regulations in air
transport enshrine "preferential measures" in order to gradually
eliminate the current inequalities with respect to air transport
market access.10 5 The African States further contended that the
world order required a new system of ethics which could be reflected in the form of preferential measures, taking into account
the economic conditions of developing countries. These preferential measures would have to be applied to States with equity
and fair distribution of world resources. They would, according
to the recommendation, have to bring into play social considerations such as solidarity and equality with regard to opportunities. In practice, the proposing States contended, such
preferential measures would have to provide for a transfer of
wealth, not in the form, of aid provided by those who remain in
the market to those excluded by it, but through giving a new
understanding to some basic principles such as reciprocity,
which needs to be rethought and reformulated. The African
States that submitted this proposal to the Conference requested
ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/7, at 3 (Apr. 14, 1994).
See generally ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP16, at 3 (May 23,
1994).
105 ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/80, at 2 (Nov. 23, 1994).
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that ICAO be entrusted
with the task of developing such prefer10 6
ential measures.

The States of Latin America and the Caribbean reaffirmed
the principles and objectives contained in the Chicago Convention, but noted that the State parties to the Convention had different levels of development and, therefore, any proposal aimed
at establishing future air transport regulation must recognize
that reality. The Latin American and Caribbean States did not
believe that the proposals on market access, as formulated,
would not guarantee consistency with the principles of the Chicago Convention which, in their view, admitted of the co-existence of markets which are organized differently. They therefore
recommended an approach that allowed direct participation
and adaptation by developing countries, such as one that allowed effective access by those countries to funding and advanced technologies under reasonable financial and economic
conditions. 7 Citing the Andean Group of States in Latin
America as an example of progressive economic integration and
cooperation, the proposing States reaffirmed that the development of air transport in Latin America and the Caribbean was
crucial to the socioeconomic progress of the region. They further pointed out that in that context the proposed safety net,
safeguards, and dispute resolution mechanisms did not adequately guarantee effective participation or adaptation by the region's airlines. The States requested that ICAO, as the
governing body for the development of air transport, continue
its in-depth studies in such a way that any future air transport
regulation would take into account real possibilities for participation and adaptation by all States and, in particular, by developing States. 08
The Arab States' position was that future arrangements for
the regulation of international air transport should largely depend on the scope of cooperation among States. They also believed that, while these arrangements may be necessary, any new
regulations should be cautiously thought out before they are
considered appropriate as replacements to existing ones. The
proposed market access principles and safety net solution, together with ownership and control clauses, were in this context
inadequate and must be subject to deeper study and considera106

Id,

ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/90, at 1 (Nov. 30, 1994).
108 Id at 2.

107

19961

AIR TRAFFC RIGHTS

827

tion. While the Arab States endorsed progressive deregulation
of international air transport, they observed that the present bilateral system of market access was aimed at facilitating air transport operations by air carriers of States and argued that serious
consideration should be given by the Conference to these facts
in formulating future'regulatory arrangements. 0 9
The Russian Federation proposed regionally-based regulation
as the most acceptable form for States with compatible levels of
economic development. The rationale for this view was that
levels of economic development vary from country to country
and States would not be able to enter into multilateral arrangements for the world-wide regulation of commercial air transport. According to the view of the Russian Federation, regional
arrangements between groups of States with similar economic
development could eventually lead to liberalized market access
and a multilateral "open skies" agreement.110 The Russian Federation also believed that a mechanism for liberalization of international air transport would give rise to a compelling and
urgent need to study its legal consequences. The Federation
recommended that the ICAO Legal Committee study the legal
implications of such regulation, allowing the ICAO Secretariat
to develop recommendations which would define terms and
concepts such as "market access" and "access right." ll Several
States also recorded their views on the subject of regulation of
air transport. Algeria suggested that air services agreements
should be revised on the basis of an equitable sharing of capacity according to the traffic generation of each party up to a 65%
to 35% division, and that any combination beyond this limit
should be negotiated multilaterally. Brazil recommended that a
multilateral arrangement should relate only to technical and administrative clauses, and Hungary focused attention on the importance of air law and aviation economics in future
international air transport, calling for a sustained program of
training of personnel in these subjects to meet future challenges. The Netherlands suggested a via media between bilateralism and multilateralism and recommended regional
cooperation as the appropriate measure. Japan cautioned the
Conference against the possible adverse effects of regulatory lib109ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/89, at 1-2 (Nov. 30, 1994, revised
Dec. 1, 1994).
110 ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/WP/78, at 1 (Nov. 23, 1994).
-

ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/79, at 1-2 (Nov. 23, 1994).
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eralization and suggested a careful study of the effects of
liberalization.'

2

On the general principle that all rights, existing and newly
granted, should be fully respected, the Conference concluded
that bilateralism and multilateralism could coexist and could
each accommodate different approaches to international air
transport regulation. The Conference also felt that liberalization at the sub-regional or regional level provided valuable experience regarding content, process, and structure of regulatory
change. 113 One of the factors considered by the Conference as
critical for the development and efficient growth of air transport
was the training of personnel in the fields of aviation law, economics, and management. Accordingly, the Conference concluded that ICAO should continue to play a role in facilitating
the evolution of future regulatory arrangements for international air transport and should, within available resources, proceed with studies on a number of important issues including
safeguards, safety nets, and other measures to ensure fair com14
petition, code sharing, and computer reservations systems.'
The Conference also adopted a recommendation recognizing
that, fifty years after the signing of the Chicago Convention, international air transport was going through a period of dynamic
change and in this context a general goal was the achievement
of the gradual, progressive, orderly, and safeguarded liberalization of international air transport regulation. The recommendation called for ICAO to exert. a leadership role in the
economic regulation of international civil aviation."' The recommendation recognized that ICAO should continue to play a
role in facilitating the evolution of future regulatory arrangements for international air transport on a bilateral, regional,
and global basis-taking into account at all times the importance to States of effective participation in international air
transport-and proceed with studies and develop recommenda112 ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/93, at 3-1 (Dec. 2, 1994).
It is
also noteworthy that the IATA declared that a sensible course should be steered
between excessive regulation and destructive laissez-faire, while Airports Council
International (ACI) stated that liberalization was welcome in principle but
should not threaten airline competition. ACI believed that in such an eventuality, government action should be considered and that on an overall basis, airports
should be involved in the regulatory process and airport interests should be reflected in regulations emanating from such a process. Id. at 3-2.
113

Id.
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& at 3-4.
ICAO Working Paper No. AT Conf/4-WP/94, at A-4 (Dec. 6, 1994).
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tions as appropriate on a number of important issues. One of
these issues was the further development and refinement of the
safeguard mechanism and "safety net" arrangement presented
to the Conference, along with other alipropriate preventive
measures to ensure safe and orderly development of international air transport and fair competition. 16
The World-Wide Air Transport Conference was successful in
eliciting from some States and groups of States their respective
positions on the award of air traffic rights to air carriers. The
positions were diverse, ranging from a cry for regionalism to a
request for sustained adherence to bilateralism until a viable alternative was agreed upon. There was also the view that any new
regulatory regime should be embarked upon with caution. In
addition to this newfound wisdom, the international air transport industry has also had the benefit of knowing how air carriers of the developed and the developing world have conducted
themselves between the Colloquium and the Conference in
sharing air traffic rights with each other. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that a world-wide multilateral regulatory
regime would be accepted on an absolute basis within the near
future. One alternative seems to be regionalism, although, conceptually, it has been met with mixed signals from such blocs as
Europe and North America.
The only remaining measure is to revisit the liberalized market access concept with a closer look at the "safety net" philosophy. Since the World-Wide Air Transport Conference was held,
the ICAO Council has decided that studies on the following four
topics should be referred to a panel: development and refinement of the safeguard mechanism and "safety net" arrangement
presented to the Conference (topic 1); review of the traditional
air carrier ownership and control criteria (topic 2); development into more formalized structures of some regulatory ar'rangements on "doing business" matters (topic 5); and possible
development into more formalized structures of some regulatory arrangements on "hard rights" (topic 6). The Air Transport Regulation Panel, which carried out regulatory work arising
from the air transport conferences in 1977 and 1980, is being
reactivated with revised membership and new terms of reference for this task. The Panel will undertake the work concerned
as a matter of high priority during the next triennium (19961998) and report its findings to the Air Transport Committee.
116
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H.

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the many attempts by the international community to
find a common ground to tread in the field of air traffic rights,
both the developed and developing nations still seem to lean
heavily towards protecting the established market share of their
carriers in given routes. At present, the Chairman of United
Airlines is reported to have accused British aviation regulators of
being too protectionist. 17 The contentious issue in this context
was the bilateral air services negotiations between the United
States and the United Kingdom in which U.S. carriers have been
demanding more access to London's Heathrow Airport. Under
prevailing regulations, only two U.S. carriers are permitted to
operate air services into Heathrow, and the United States claims
that the number of flights and destinations granted ex London
to U.S. carriers is limited.11
At the same time, the European Commission, which, is attempting to take over the negotiation of air traffic rights on behalf of member States of the European Union, has commenced
legal action against individual member States who have signed
individual deals with the United States. The European Union
believes that all its member States would benefit from a Unionwide agreement with the United States on air transport services.
The Union believes that such an agreement would balance reciprocal levels of market access with an adequate framework of
safeguards and other provisions to ensure free and fair competition. Transport Commissioner Neil Kinnock has observed:
I do not believe that this balance can be achieved on the basis of
the bilateral "open skies" agreements between the US and some
member States of the European Union. The cumulative effects
of those agreements would undermine the system of conditional
access on which the EU internal market is based and they would
establish an unwelcome precedent for future negotiations. 119
Also, the United States has been involved in protracted bilateral
air services negotiations with Japan, and in the Summer of 1995,
the two States decided on what each thought was a mutually
beneficial air services agreement. 20 Meanwhile, in the Asia-Pacific region, Hong Kong and Australia had given each other six
117United Says Chicago-Heathrow Service Is Constrained to Keep Out Compeitition,
AVIATION DAiLY, May 24, 1995, at 305.
118Id.
119Malory Davies, Battlefor the Open Skies, GLOBAL TRANSP., Autumn 1995, at 45.

120 Policy-BilateralRelations, ITA Press, 01-31, Aug. 1995, at 2.
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months to find a solution to the dispute between QANTAS and
Cathay Pacific Airways over the Australian carrier's Fifth Freedom rights at Kai Tak to Singapore and Bangkok. Cathay Pacific Airways alleged that QANTAS had taken undue adv,,ntage
of those rights. The bilateral air services agreement between the
two countries, which expired in the summer of 1995, was extended in its present form until the end of 1995 to give negotiators adequate time to consider the two carriers' accusations of
21

unfair competition.1

A new dimension to the air traffic rights debate is reflected in
the recent position taken by airports in Europe that are increasingly disturbed by delays in opening up more air service opportunities. Recently, Airports Council International (ACI)-the
association of airports worldwide-,-claimed that States have thus
far listened only to the views of their national airlines in negotiating air services agreements with other States. Also, ACI maintains that airports should be consulted on the basis that
increases or decreases in the use of air traffic rights by carriers
would directly affect utilization of the airports concerned. 122
Although the position taken by ACI is logical and justifiable, this
new player in the arena portends to be an additional voice in
the future that would only succeed in making any move towards
liberalization of commercial air services more complex.
At the thirty-first session of the ICAO Assembly, which held
deliberations in September and October 1995, the Assembly
adopted a resolution that recognizes ICAO as the multilateral
body in the United Nations system competent to deal with air
transport and develop, on a continuing basis, policy guidance
on the regulation of international air transport for contracting
States. The thrust of this resolution is that ICAO is charged on a
continuing basis with recommending policy on the economic
regulation of air transport.12 3 It remains to be seen how this
mandate would be affected by the conservatism which still attaches to commercial air transport.

121 Id
-122 Jeff Apter, Airports Demand Voice at Air Service Negotiations, AIRPORT FORUM,

Sept. 5, 1995, at 8.
123 ICAO Working Paper No. A31-WP/224, P/57, Report on Agenda Item 36.15, at Resolution 36.1/1.
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IV.

A.

COMPETITION RULES IN WTO

AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES WITHIN GATS

There has been sustained interest in the world of commerce
in bringing international air services within the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 124 under the umbrella of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) .125 The above
resolution of the thirty-first session of the ICAO Assembly addresses this issue by recognizing that ICAO has actively promoted an understanding by all parties concerned of the
provisions of the Chicago Convention and of ICAO's particular
mandate and role in international air transport. The resolution
also requests the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its
member States to accord due consideration to ICAO's constitutional responsibility to international air transport, which could
be discharged through the results of ICAO's World-Wide Air
Transport Conference and ICAO's continuing work on eco126
nomic regulation of international air transport.
In the process of its deliberations, the ICAO Colloquium of
1992 considered the views of experts on whether air traffic
rights should be considered trade in services and brought within
the purview of GATT, a proposal that had been included in its
Agenda under GATS. There has been sustained debate in the
124 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruquay Round): General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993,
33 I.L.M. 44 [hereinafter GATS].
125 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signatureOct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinater GATT]. GATT was a multilateral body
established in Geneva on January 1, 1948 after the General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade (GATT), negotiated and signed by 23 countries, came into force.
GATT functions as the principal international body concerned with negotiating
reduction of trade barriers and with international trade relations. While GATT
offers a forum to member States to discuss and overcome their problems and to
negotiate enlargements of world trading opportunities, it is also a code of rules
calculated to liberalize world trade. GATS is an annex to the main GATT agreement and has a special segment on air transport services as trade in services.
One of the agreements contained in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round establishes a World Trade Organization that will serve as a single' institutional framework for GAT as well as all the agreements and arrangements concluded under
the Uruguay Round. See generally infra note 131 (discussing trade agreement
rounds). This permanent organizational framework, which replaces the GATT
structure, will be headed by a Ministerial Conference at least once every two years
and will include a General Council to oversee the operation of the Agreement,
settle disputes, and review trade policy. Therefore, all references to GATT in this
paper will imply references to the World Trade Organization.
126 ICAO Working Paper No. A31-WP/224, P/57, supra note 123, at Resolution
36.1/1.
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aviation world whether air services performed by commercial
airlines-operating both scheduled and unscheduled flightsshould be included in GATS, which seeks to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services with
a view to expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency, 127 national treatment, 12 and progressive liberalization. 129 The fundamental principle of GATT is its Most Favored
Nation (MFN) Treatment clause, under which each party to the
agreement accords immediately and unconditionally to services
and service providers of any other party, treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to like services and service providers of any other country. 130 These provisions reflect the basic
philosophy of GATS and play a vital role in affecting the decision of the international community on whether or not air transport services should be brought under its purview. Other
features of GATS that have attracted discussion in relation to air
services are provisions relating to increasing participation of de132
veloping countries within GATS l3 ' and dispute settlement.
127 GATS, supranote 124, 33 I.L.M. at 49-50. Article III of GATS requires each
'party to promptly publish all relevant laws, regulations, administrative guidelines,
decisions, rulings, or measures of general application before they enter into
force.
128 Id. at 60-61. GATT's national treatment philosophy provides foreign services and services suppliers with treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
a country's own services and service suppliers.
2
Id. at 61-63. Since GATS is an annex to the GAT'T agreement, the provisions of GATS are governed by those of GATT, and both documents incorporate
the same basic principles.
130 Id. at 49. Article XVI extends the MFN principle to market access. Id. at 60.
i1 Id. at 50. GATS provides that the increasing participation of developing
countries in world trade shall be facilitated through negotiated specific commitments by different parties. It also requires developed member States to establish
contact points within two years after GATS enters into force to facilitate the access of developing States' service providers to information related to their respective markets concerning: commercial and technical aspects of the supply of
services; registration, recognition, and obtaining of professional qualifications;
and the availability of service technology. The provision also states that special
priority will be given to the least developed States in the implementation of Article IV and that particular account will be taken of the difficulties experienced by
developing States in accepting negotiated commitments in view of their special
economic situation and their development, trade, and financial needs. Id. at 51.
132 Id. at 63-64. Article XXIII on dispute settlement is well balanced and equitable. It provides that, if any party should consider that another party fails to
carry out its obligations or commitments under the agreement, it may make written representations or proposals to the other party or parties concerned, and that
the latter shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals
so made. If no satisfactory settlement can be achieved, GATT provides for a formal dispute settlement procedure. Id.
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The issue of trade in services in general was discussed in
GATT's latest round of multilateral trade negotiations launched
by ministers of GATT contracting States who met in September
1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The Uruguay Round was the
eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations held by GATT so
far13 3 and one of the most complex. This round of negotiations
was assisted by the Group of Negotiators on Services (GNS)
which the GATT established in 1986 to follow the services negotiations. The GNS had drafted a detailed agreement comprising
thirty-five articles and five annexes, with one of the annexes
comprising provisions on air transport services. The Annex on
Air Transport Services13 4 applies both to scheduled and unscheduled air services-and generally excludes its application to
the following:
a) air traffic rights covered by the Chicago Convention, including the five freedoms of the air1 3 5 and bilateral air services agreements; and
133 There have been seven other rounds of trade agreements: 1947 in Geneva;
1949 in Annecy, France; 1951 in Torquay, United Kingdom; 1955-1956 in Geneva; 1960-1962 in Geneva (the Dillon round); 1964-1967 in Geneva (the Kennedy round); 1973-1979 in Geneva (the Tokyo round). The Tokyo round began
in September 1973 and produced the most comprehensive agreements of the
rounds of negotiations. Negotiations of the Tokyo round, in which 99 member
States participated, were concluded in November 1979 with agreements covering:
an improved legal framework for the conduct of world trade (including recognition of tariff and non-tariff treatment in favor of and among developing countries
as a permanent legal feature of the world trading system); non-tariff measures
(subsidies and countervailing measures); technical barriers to trade; government
procurement; customs valuation; import licensing procedures; a revision of the
1967 GATT anti-dumping code; bovine meat; dairy products; tropical products;
and an agreement on free trade in civil aircraft. The agreements contained special and more favorable treatment for developing countries.
134 GATS, Annex on Air Transport Services, 33 I.L.M. at 76-77 [hereinafter
Annex].
135 The Five Freedoms of the air were created at the Chicago Convention of
1944 and comprise the following:
1) the right to fly over the territory of another country without
landing;
2) the right to land in another country for technical reasons;
3) the right to discharge traffic from the home country in a foreign
country;
4) the right to pick up traffic in a foreign country bound for the
home country; and
5) the right to pick up traffic in a foreign country and convey them
to yet another country, provided that the flight originates or terminates in the home country.
Stockfish, supra note 64, at 652 n.12 (quoting ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-6 (1981)).
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b) directly related activities which would limit or affect the ability of parties to negotiate, grant or to receive traffic13fights
or
6
which. would have the effect of limiting their exercise.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, GATS applies to computer reservations systems in air transport, the selling or marketing of air transport services, and aircraft maintenance. 137 The
proposition that GATS would not apply to air traffic fights covered by the Chicago Convention but would apply to the selling
or marketing of air transport services creates a dichotomy that
must be resolved. Air traffic rights that result from the Chicago
Convention's provisions are the tools for selling or marketing
air transport services, and the two are inextricably linked to each
other. Confusion is compounded by Article I of GATS which
defines trade in services as, among other things, the supply of a
service from the territory of one party into the territory of another party. 138 The application of this definition to the provision of air transport services by an air transport enterprise would
lead to the inexorable conclusion that the definition of trade in
services provided in GATS refers implicitly to the exercise of air
traffic rights, which are obtained by virtue of the Chicago Convention. The explicit exclusion of air traffic rights in GATS is
therefore ambivalent.
For the present, the overall purpose of including air transport
services in GATS seems to be to apply the broad principles of
market access and the MFN philosophy to the selling or marketing of air traffic services. The purview of GATS in controlling
air transport services would therefore be considered mostly in
situations where air traffic rights are exercised multilaterally or
plurilaterally. Although theoretically GATS could apply in instances where States elect to use Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, which applies to all bilateral air services agreements
and requires permission of a grantor State for a commercial air
transport enterprise to operate air services into or out of that
State but does not preclude plurilateral or multilateral permission, it remains to be seen whether Article 6 would be rendered
ineffective in the future. In any event, lack of confidence in the
Annex on Air Transport Services to GATS is reflected in the pro-

supra note 134, 2, 33 I.L.M. at
137 Id.
3.
18 GATS, supra note 124, 33 I.L.M. at 48.
136 Annex,

77.
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vision that the operation of the Annex
shall be reviewed periodi139
cally or at least every five years.
Two provisions in the Annex on Air Transport Services in
GATS are also worthy of mention. The first provision is the access to and use of publicly available services offered by a party
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, 140 and the second
is dispute settlement procedures which could be invoked only
where dispute settlement procedures provided for in bilateral
air services agreements or under the Chicago Convention itself
14 1
have been exhausted.
The regulation of air transport services lies within individual
states and ICAO, which maintains in its Legal Bureau a register
of all bilateral air transport agreements. The bilateral air transport agreement usually includes a -reciprocal agreement between States for their carriers to have fair and equal opportunity
in operating air services between their territories without unduly
affecting the air services operated by the other State. Under a
bilateral agreement, capacity offered by carriers must bear a
close relationship to the needs of the people using air transport. 142 These regulatory provisions have so far succeeded in
protecting carriers of lesser developed States by obtaining for
them fair and equal opportunity to operate air services in routes
that are shared by more established carriers of wealthier
43
nations. 1

Since GATS cannot sustain air transport services within a bilateral framework, it now remains to be seen whether the aviation
community will move toward placing air traffic rights in a multilateral or plurilateral system. In such an eventuality, GATS
would undoubtedly rejuvenate its efforts at seeking to include
air transport services within its purview under liberalized market
access and the MFN treatment clause. In this context, the role
played by ICAO-the guardian and mentor of international civil
aviation-becomes relevant.
ICAO has the mandate (under the Chicago Convention), as
well as the experience and expertise in a wide range of air trans1 5, 33 I.L.M. at 77.
Id. at 78.
141 Id.
4, at 77.
142 These conditions are the result of an agreement reached on February 11,
1946 by the United States and the United Kingdom in Bermuda. For a clear
analysis of the Bermuda Agreement, see RAMON DE MuIRAs, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 52-72 (1989).
143 See generally Abeyratne, supra note 26, at 3.
139 Annex, supra note 134,
140
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port matters-technical, economic, and legal. Issues of operating arrangements, market access, pricing, and capacity for the
designated airlines of each State are the subject of bilateral air
transport agreements between States, except for arrangements
within the European Economic Community for mutual relations
between member States. International air transport is, in effect,
conducted under an extensive network of some 3000 separate
bilateral agreements or treaties. ICAO has taken the position
that international air transport is an economic activity in which
there is a strong national interest and involvement as well as a
long established, comprehensive, and detailed structure of standards, principles, and operating arrangements.
ICAO believes it important to draw to the attention of GATS
and its member States certain critical features of international
air transport which are relevant to any present or future consideration of how air transport should be treated in the context of
the trade in services negotiations. The main consideration that
impels ICAO to maintain steadfastly its position as the guiding
force behind air transport services is that it feels that bilateralism at the operating level has over the decades proved to be a
flexible system that allows States to pursue their objectives,
whether these be open and competitive or more protective or
restrictive regimes for their airlines. ICAO strongly maintains
that any external multilateral framework which sought general
or limited application must recognize and be compatible with
this existing structure of air transport..
Nevertheless, multilateralism in the form of a broad-based
consensus on principles and guidance to States in the conduct
of their air transport activities has enjoyed renewed interest in
ICAO in recent years. While seeking to progressively develop
positions and guidance to assist States in their regulatory and
economic activities, ICAO recognizes the sovereignty of States in
pursuing their own national air transport policies and objectives. ICAO's role in this sphere is, therefore, merely consultative and recommendatory without being incompatible with
liberalization in this sector. ICAO has also expressed its resolve
to continue to cooperate with GATT and the GNS in its trade in
services discussions to ensure that ICAO's views and concerns,
and the particular features of the international air transport sector, are properly taken into account by GATT and the GNS.
The Organization's position on the regulation of air transport
services was formally adopted at its seventh assembly held in
June and July 1953. Assembly Resolution A7-15 resolved that
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there was no prospect at the time of achieving a universal multilateral agreement, although ICAO acknowledged that the
achievement of multilateralism in commercial rights remained
an objective of the Organization.1 4 4 This Resolution is still in
force and reflects ICAO's commitment to achieving an acceptable multilateral basis for air transport services.
Later, at its twenty-sixth session in September and October
1986, the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A26-14, which reaffirmed that ICAO was the multilateral body in the United Nations system competent to deal with international air transport
and urged contracting States that participated in any multilateral negotiations on trade in services where international air
transport was included to ensure that their representatives were
fully aware of potential conflicts with the existing legal system
for the regulation of international air transport.1 45 The Resolution also requested the ICAO Council to actively promote a full
understanding by international bodies involved with trade in
services of the role of ICAO in international air transport and
the existing structure of international agreements regarding air
transport. This Resolution helped sensitize States and GATT regarding the air transport sector. Although this Resolution is no
longer in force, it adequately reflects ICAO's philosophy on the
subject. In view of the significant recent and possible future developments in the trade in service negotiations, the question
arises, however, as to whether this policy is capable of serving
the interests of ICAO and international air transport over the
next few years, or. whether it requires reassessment and additional directives from the Assembly.
Assembly Resolution A26-14 gave guidance to.States and the
Council and expressed certain concerns, but it did not set out
an organizational view on the inclusion of international air
transport in a multilateral agreement on trade in services. It
would be interesting to see whether a future session of the Assembly would consider developing such a view for transmission
to GATT and the GNS as well as to Contracting States.
One view the Assembly may consider is the exclusion of air
transport from services agreements. The adoption of such a position by ICAO could be grounded on two of the concerns
144 Prospects of and Methods for FurtherInternationalAgreement on CommercialRights
in InternationalAir Transport-Scheduled InternationalAir Services, Res. A7-15, ICAO
Doc. 7670, at 213 (1947-1955).
145 Air TransportRelated Activities by Other InternationalBodies InterestedIn Trade In
Services, Res. A26-14, at 74, ICAO Doc. 9495, A26-RES (1986).
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found in Resolution A26-14. One is the Organization's concern
about ICAO's role as the United Nations' specialized agency responsible in air transport matters. The other is the Organization's concern for the integrity of the Chicago Convention
principles and arrangements and the widespread system of bilateral air transport agreements'that are a consequence of those
principles.
At ICAO's Air Transport Colloquium of April 1992, at least
two speakers urged caution on the subject of handing over air
transport services to GATS. IATA's Director General, Gunter
Eser, informed the Colloquium that most international airlines
categorically opposed the inclusion of air transport services ,in
GATS. 146 Dr. Eser, while recognizing that national interests
clearly exist in air traffic rights issues, drew the attention of the
Colloquium to the economic concerns of the airline industry.
He saw the need for a balance between economic regulations
and a free market, on the basis that bilateralism cannot exist on
its own in view of multilateral practices in such areas as tariff
coordination which have proven that plurilateralism has a distinct edge over bilateralism in commercial air transport. 147 Dr.
Eser's assessment was that any such plurilateralism would be best
developed by ICAO and not a trade institution such as GATT. 148
Another speaker at the Colloquium, Vijay Poonoosamy, said:
The underlying premise of GATT is that free trade in the air
transport sector will promote economic growth and development. I beg to differ. To enable international air transport to
deliver its many and varied goods in a safe and orderly manner
we must steer a common sense and enlightened course between
regulatory overkill and destructive, laissez-faire for more than 45
years. ICAO has provided a means for governments to cooperate
in the development and maintenance of an effective trading environment for international air transport. Today ICAO provides
14 9
the proper forum for charting such a vital course for survival.
Gary Sampson, Director, GNS Division GATT, expressed the
view that the airline industry over the last decade had changed
dramatically, moving towards reduced administrative regulation
146

A Role for GATT?, AIRLINE Bus., June 1992, at 37.

147

ICAO Working Paper No. WATC-1.10, at 1 (Apr. 6, 1992); see also A Role for

GATT?, supra note 146, at 37; Ron Katz, ICAO Montreal Colloquium: The Future of
Air Transport Regulation, 10 IFALPA INT'L Q. REv. 7, 13-15 (1992).
148 Prospect of GATT-Like Structure Resisted at ICAO Meeting, AVIATION DAILY, Apr.

9, 1992, at 56.
149 ICAO Working Paper No. WATC-3.11, at 4 (Apr. 8, 1992).
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of airlines and the promotion of competition through greater
reliance on market forces as opposed to government fiat in determining service levels such as fares, capacities, and frequencies. Sampson further stated that, although there was a clear
distinction between hard rights such as air traffic rights and soft
rights such as marketing and sales rights, the application of
GATS both to hard and soft rights would enable participants to
concentrate their efforts on doing business without restraint
under GATS. 15 ° David Buckingham, the Australian delegate to
the Colloquium, was of the view that what the international
community needed was not a simplistic affirmation of the relevance to aviation of the GATT principles of free trade, but a
broad-based agreement that liberalized trade in aviation
rights.1 51 Daniel M. Kasper, author, 1 52 stressed that fundamental
GATT principles, such as the unconditional MFN and market
access clauses, were likely to impede rather than advance liberalization. Instead, he advocated a conditional MFN treatment scenario under a plurilateral system where only those parties
willing and able to accede to terms of the agreement would be
153
required to comply.

The main strength of the GATT approach to air transport
services lies in its commitment to liberalization within a defined
time scale. The discipline of GATT in accomplishing its objectives also acts as a positive factor. In a general sense, GATT is
viewed with favor by those who see some merit in its role as custodian and guide of air transport services, for two reasons:
a) The modern trend of aviation towards globalization, privatization and cross-border alliances and Computer Reservations Systems (CRS) conglomerates, and the overall tendency of air
transport operators to seek market access, have made bilateralism obsolete. The changing structure of international civil aviation needs to consider multilateralism, which is the ideal of
GAT'T.
b) The Uruguay Round, which intends to envelop air transport
services in the GATT concept, advocates a process of gradual lib-

151

152

ICAO Working Paper No. WATC-3,13, at 4 (Apr. 8, 1992).
ICAO Working Paper No. WATC-3.15, at 5 (Apr. 8, 1992).
See DANIEL M. KASPER, DEREGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION: LIBERALIZING

TERNATIONAL TRADE IN AIR SERVICES

(1988).

153 ICAO Working Paper No. WATC-3.17, at 5 (Apr. 8, 1992).
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eralization (firstly only of "soft" rights), negotiated market access
and an efficient dispute settlement system."'
Arguments against GATT's role in air transport services are,
however, more compelling, the most basic being that aviation
issues must essentially come within the purview of an organization specialized in international civil aviation such as ICAO.
The strongest objection is aimed at the principles of GATT such
as the unconditional MFN treatment philosophy, which is calculated to lead to competitive imbalances between airlines, and
the long and tedious process of GATT which would take time to
resolve disputes. More expeditious measures are available
under the existing bilateral system.' 5 5 To overcome this problem, experts have suggested that GATT's MFN rule should apply
only to "soft" trading rights in aviation (such as ground handling, CRS systems, and sales), and that "hard" rights should be
included in a multilateral agreement outside GATT."5 6 Kasper
opposes the application of the MFN philosophy to air services:
[U] nconditional MFN would deprive air service negotiators of essential flexibility. Trade barriers in air services vary widely in
form and impact across markets, forcing even liberal nations to
discriminate when granting traffic rights in order to counteract
the sometimes severe restraints their carriers encounter in foreign markets. Due to the nature of these non-tariff barriers and
to the fact that they often arise in ancillary markets, a universal
solution, such as the elimination of the ancillary restraints by all
signatories, would be exceedingly difficult to negotiate and to
enforce.
Under these circumstances, adopting unconditional MFN would
undermine the ability of governments to tailor packages of economic rights that offset the mix of restraints in particular foreign
markets. It would be especially troubling for those markets
characterised by a high degree of cooper-Ation
between the na57
tional airline and the government.1
There is also a concern that, unlike in a bilateral negotiation for
air traffic rights where two States can readily analyze the economic implications of sharing air traffic rights between points of
the two States, the MFN principle would create a free-for-all, the
154 Geoffrey Lipman, Is GA7T Just Another Four Letter Word?, 4 AEROSPACE
WoRLD, Sept. 1990, at 97-98; see also Daniel M. Kasper, The GATT Approach-Applying the GAT to Air Services-Will it Work? ITA MAG., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 5, 9-12.
155 Kathryn B. Creedy, Should Air Transport Be in or out of GATT? 9 INTERAVIA

716, 717 (1990).
156 Id.
157 KASPER,

supra note 152, at 96.
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consequences of which could not be economically assessed or
controlled.
IATA has suggested that ICAO adopt GATT principles with
regard to all aspects of the air services agreement except in the
area of air traffic rights and frequency of operations of aircraft.158 This suggestion has been strongly resisted by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which argues that the
aviation field should retain its purity of having characteristics
and attributes that are susceptible to negotiation, although air
traffic rights should be negotiated under a more efficient system
than the prevailing bilateral system.15 9 Kasper shares a compatible view: "To achieve true liberalization in air services, a new
approach will be required, one that focuses on securing agreement among a relatively small group of liberal trading partners
willing to abide by a strict condition on a reasonably level play160
ing field.

Although GATS does not seek control over air traffic rights, it
is appropriate to consider this subject as a future consideration
of the overall GATT philosophy. It is evident that the principles
of GATT are inconsistent with the present legal regime that applies to air traffic rights. The Chicago Convention is the sole
legal document that governs the principle of air traffic rights
and explicitly recognizes the principles of State sovereignty in
Article 1. The sovereignty of a State reserves for that State the
right to control activities within its territory and, afortiori, the
Convention strengthens this concept by requiring that special
permission of a State be obtained for the operation of air services into and out of its territory by an air transport operator of
another State.
The foregoing discussion reflects that, ever since the question
of commercial air traffic rights arose as a corollary to the principle of sovereignty as recognized in the Paris Convention, and
later in the Chicago Convention, air transport has been viewed
as a social need, run on equality of opportunity that is not a
mere theoretical concept but one that can be practically enjoyed
by States.1 61 In addition, Dr. Wassenbergh opines that State policy in civil aviation must protect the integrity and identity of the
158 Views on Change of Air Rights Vary Widely at ICAO Conference, WoRLD AIRLINE
NEWS, Apr. 13, 1992, at 1.
159 Id.
160 KASPER, supra note 152.
161 SeeJohn C. McCarroll, The Bermuda Capacity Clauses in theJet Age, 29J. AIR L.
& COM. 115, 119 (1963) (" ' [F]air and equal opportunity... to operate' should
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national society. 11 2 The Chicago Convention's Preamble calls
for cooperation between nations and peoples so that international air transport services may be established on the basis of
equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically.
The Chicago Convention further charges ICAO with preventing
economic waste caused by unreasonable competition 6 3 and ensuring that the rights of contracting States are fully respected
and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines. 1 64 The critical question, therefore, is
whether multilateral liberalization of the bilateral air services
agreement would preclude some States from having a fair opportunity to operate international airlines. It is only logical to
conclude that the answer to the question of whether multilateralism should ultimately replace bilateralism lies in a clear perception of what is meant by "multilateralism" in this context,
and whether multilateralism would interfere with the States'
right to the practical enjoyment of fair and equal opportunity in
the operation of air services.
B.

NATURE OF

WTO's

COMPETITION RULES

The World Trade Organization-which, unlike GATT, is not an
agency of the United Nations-has reached an understanding
to address the issue of air traffic rights at an appropriate time in
mean ... equality of practical capability to compete."); see also P. van der Tuuk
Adriani, The "Bermuda" Capacity Clauses, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. 406, 413 (1955).
162 H.A. Wassenbergh, Reality and Value in Air and Space Law, 3 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 323, 352 (1978). Dr. Wassenbergh lists seven objectives of a State's policy in respect of modem civil aviation. They are:
a) to contribute to the functioning of the international community
of States as a total legal order by upholding and further developing
the rule of international law;
b) to protect the integrity and identity of the national society;
c) to promote the nation's participation in man's activities in the
air and in space;
d) to create the best possible conditions and opportunities for use
by the public of aviation and space facilities;
e) to increase the benefits to be derived from the use of the air and
of outer space for its nationals;
f) to promote the further development of technology and the
knowledge of man;
g) to co-operate with other States on the basis of equal rights in
order to bridge conflicting national interests and achieve the aims
mentioned above.
Id.
163 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1193, 15 U.N.T.S. at 327.
164 Id
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the future.1 6 5 It is, therefore, very relevant to examine the competition rules of WTO.
The genesis of competition law in trade
and, therefore, of
WTO rules on competition, may well lie in the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana in November 1947. This conference laid the ground for the International Trade Organization (ITO), the charter of which had two
chapters relating to competition. Chapter III of the Charter
provided that no member shall impose unreasonable or unjustifiable impediments that would preclude other members from
obtaining on equitable terms facilities for economic development.166 Chapter V, which provided for the elimination of restrictive business practices, requires that each member take
appropriate measures, individually or through collective involvement, to prevent business practices from affecting international
trade, leading to restrained competition, limited access to markets, or fostered monopolistic practices. 167 The ITO competition rules were embellished with controls over price-fixing and
other anti-competitive practices endemic to private enterprises.
However, the functioning of ITO never attained fruition, and
these provisions remained academic. A second attempt was
made by the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) ,168 but this effort, too, was destined for failure. The
third attempt, made by GATT in 1959, also failed to elicit a concrete proposal. Later, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established a system of
exchange of information and a procedure for consultation of
competition rules among enforcement authorities.
WTO was established on January 1, 1995, and will administer
the new global trade rules, agreed upon in the Uruguay Round,
which came into effect on the same day. These rules, which are
the result of seven years of negotiations among member States
of GATT, establish the rule of law in international trade, estimated at $5 trillion in 1995. The WTO involvement in world
16 ICAO Working Paper No. A31-WP/224, P/57, at 36.1:17 (Oct. 2, 1995).
166 See Havana CharterforAnInternationalTrade Organization,U.N. Doc. E/Conf.

478"(1948), reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, Pub. No. 3117 (1948) Commercial
Policy Series 133 at 8-9.
167 For a detailed discussion of the ITO, see Robert R. Wilson, Proposed ITO
Charter,41 Am. J. Ir'L L. 879, 881-82 (1947).
168 U.N. Economic and Social Council, 134th Sess., 546th mtg., U.N. Doc. 5/
SR.546 (1951); see also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business
Practices, 22 Sess., U.N. Doc. E/2380 (1953).
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trade is estimated to raise the fiscal proportions of trade to $500
billion by the year 2005.169 The WTO has a membership of 150

States and is far wider in scope than its predecessor, bringing
into the multilateral trading system trade in services, intellectual
property protection, and investment. Unlike GATT, which was a
provisional treaty serviced by an ad hoc secretariat, WTO is a
full-fledged international organization in its own right and administers a unified package of agreements to which all member
States are committed. In other words, it is an improved version
of GATT and serves as an effective watchdog of international
trade and management consultant. Its economists are required
to keep a close watch on the pulse of the global economy and
provide studies on the main trade issues of the world.
WTO considers that the following four fundamental factors
are shaping the world economy: (1) the broader integration of
the world economy; (2) the sharply different trends in the developed and developing countries; (3) the spread of market-oriented reforms; and (4) the end of the Cold War. 170 On the
subject of market-oriented reforms, WTO believes:
If there are no rules in trade then the resulting anarchy will inevitably lead to conflict. International norms not only ensure freedom for economic agents to operate in their commercial interest
across national frontiers. They also enhance the freedom of governments in their trade policy interventions, by defining the
scope of actions permissible within the confines of international
more predictlaw. The behaviour of all governments becomes
171
able when all accept the rules of the game.
Obviously, WTO believes that a coherent set of rules followed in
conformity with the accepted norms of international law should
govern competition. This does not necessarily mean that WTO
is against free trade. It merely means that free trade must be
conducted according to accepted universal norms laid out in
the WTO Agreement. The trade in services portion of the
agreement carries specific rules of competition. One of the
seminal principles of the agreement requires each member
State to accord immediately and unconditionally to services and
service suppliers of any member treatment no less favorable
than that which it accords to like services and service suppliers
Focus Newsletter, WTO: GENEVA, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 2.
See Speech of Peter D. Sutherland, Director General of WTO, World Trade
OrganizationPress Release PRESS/l, Jan. 27, 1995 (95-0156), at 1.
171 Id. at 5.
169
170
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of any other country 1 72 Called the Most Favored Nations Treatment (MFN) clause, this provision establishes common ground
between trading partners and creates certain parameters of activity for partners to follow. The MFN clause is the cornerstone
of the WTO principles and acts as the fundamental postulate on
which other WTO competition rules are based.
Transparency is another concept which has been recognized
for practical applicability in the WTO rules. Accordingly, each
Member is required to "publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their entry into
force, all relevant measures of general application which pertain
to or affect the operation of this Agreement."1 73 There is also

the requirement of publication of international agreements
"pertaining to or affecting trade in services to which a Member
is a signatory." 174 Article XVII of the agreement lays down the
principle of national treatment which requires each member to
"accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member,
in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers."1

75

This provision is effectively tied

up with the principle of elimination of all discrimination from
the applicability of the agreement, as reflected in Article V,
thereby achieving the dual goal of elimination of existing discriminatory measures and prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures.
The requirement for equality of treatment is also reflected in
provisions related to market access. Article XVI requires treatment no less favorable from any member to others than that
76
uniformly provided under WIo rules.1
It is claimed that, because the primary purpose of the WTO
system is to achieve trade among members as liberally and fairly
as possible while retaining the essence of non-discrimination in
trade practices, the WTO system should guarantee a fair and
equitable opportunity for market access by enterprises of members to the national markets of other members. This is done
mainly through the removal of governmental barriers, to the exGeneral Agreements on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1169.
173 Id. at 1170.
172

Id.
175Id. at
174

176

1180.

Id. at 1179.
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tent possible, and the convergence of national regulatory regimes such-as those which relate to intellectual property rights.
One of the most serious challenges faced by WTO in this regard is the claims by some States of "unfair trade" by others,
where the claimant States feel victimized by private business
practices of enterprises of other States. Anti-dumping is one
such example, where the exporter is faced with a situation in
which imports to his country are precluded by his country, with
a view to compelling the consumption of the exporter's goods
within the country of production. This practice often leads to
price hiking and protectionism within a market. The WTO
rules, therefore, strive for fair and equal opportunity in competition, the same way the bilateral air services agreement requires.
One of the major considerations of the WTO is the perceived
incompatibility between business practices of countries and uniform competition rules which must be enforced globally. There
is an obvious link between business systems and corporate behavior on the one hand, and competition rules (or the lack
thereof) on the other. There is also probably a functional relationship between them in that competition rules partly reflect
existing business systems and corporate behavior (a regulatory
system functions well only if it is fundamentally accepted). Also,
business systems and corporate behavior often adjust to, and
take advantage of, the possibilities opened by competition rules.
To that extent, the disparities between competition rules, on
the basis that what is permitted in one State may be prohibited
in another, may influence disparities in business systems and
corporate behavior and may constitute an impediment for enterprises which seek entry into another market. Some examples
are cited below.
In the European Community (E.C.), where governmental barriers such as tariffs and import restrictions have been removed,
competition policy measures play a vital role in ensuring that
the common market operates without hindrance by private restrictive business practices. In the E.C., the role of competition
policy has increased dramatically with the progressive integration of the common market.
In the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), a77 negotiated

between the United States andJapan in 1989 and 1990, business
customs and corporate behaviors were the major issues. The
177 Joint Report of the U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Inpediments Initiative (1990).
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United States government has claimed that restrictive business
customs and corporate behavior were the major impediments to
foreign enterprises effectively accessing the Japanese market. In
accordance with the SII, both governments have agreed that an
increase of competition rules in Japan would increase access to
the Japanese market by foreign enterprises by removing private
restrictive business practices. A number of reforms of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law resulted from this agreement, including an increase of administrative surcharge and criminal fines to
be imposed on enterprises when they engage in cartels.'78 This
functional relationship between competition rules and business
systems and corporate behavior, rooted as they are in cultural,
economic, and political traditions, may, however, limit possible
achievements attained by the applicability of partial harmonization of competition rules. 179 Differences in business systems and
corporate behavior are generally wide-ranging and complex,
and the application of competition rules often may fail to bridge
the gap between the two elements. This consideration notwithstanding, a vigorous enforcement of competition rules in trading nations may still play a useful role in preparing common
rules that could be made applicable to trading nations. The
adoption of common rules of conduct for enterprises may well
reduce undue imbalances in different business systems and
could pave the way for enterprises to compete for roles in markets of trading states outside their own marketplace.
WTO should also take into consideration the fact that as
globalization of national economies is achieved through the removal of governmental' barriers to trade, such as tariffs and import restrictions, new trade issues may arise. One such issue is
the possible incompatibility between different regulatory and
business systems among trading States. Differences in domestic
regulatory systems and in business customs and behaviors often
emerge as barriers to transnational business activities. These differences may take the form of inconsistencies between technical
standards, taxation, environmental protection measures, labor
standards, and other barriers which hamper enterprises seeking
to engage in transboundary trade. Such differences obviously
create disparities among the States concerned.

178 See Mitsuo Matsushita, The StructuralImpediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. Ir'L L. 436, 443 (1991).
179 Id. at 442-43.
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Extraterritoriality is one concept which could affect more
than one jurisdiction in the application of domestic trade policy.
The United States, the European Community, and Germany are
proponents of extraterritoriality where competition rules are applied to commercial conduct of foreign enterprises' which conduct business in places other than those whose domestic
markets are affected by such trade. In the seminal ALCOA case
of 1945,180 the United States courts established the "effects" doctrine whereby commercial conduct carried out overseas but intended or calculated to affect the United States would be subject
to U.S. antitrust laws. This doctrine has been followed by the
courts in the United States with unfailing consistency, culminating in recent guidelines on international commercial operations
adopted by the U.S. Justice Department. 181 These guidelines
contain principles that give the United States a wide scope of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of anti-competitive practices which foreign enterprises follow in countries outside the
United States, provided such activities adversely affect the
United States market in that particular commercial activity.
One of the most compelling features'of this legislation is its emphasis on "market access" relating to American businesses in foreign countries. A number of hypothetical examples
incorporated in these guidelines reflect that the Department of
Justice would challenge the conduct of foreign enterprises in
foreign countries if such enterprises would hinder U.S. enter18 2
prises from exporting to or investing in a foreign country
In the famous Woodpulp case, 183 the Court of Justice of the
European Communities decided that the E.C. competition rules
apply to agreements of foreign enterprises which are entered
into outside the European Community as long as they are implemented within the common market.
One cannot deny that in this era of global economy, some
degree of extraterritoriality in the enforcement of national competition rules is inevitable. A State would, therefore, be seen as
being justified in applying its competition rules to the conduct
of foreign enterprises abroad when conduct which occurs in a
foreign country affects its economy adversely, particularly where
180 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
181See Justice and FTC Issue Draft Guidelines on InternationalAntitrust Enforcement,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1685, at 488 (Oct. 20, 1994).
182 Id. at 495-502.
183Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125-129/85, Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v.
Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193.

850

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

the State in which such conduct occurs has no competition rules
or has no intention to prohibit such conduct. This phenomenon is easily reflected by transnational business entities that may
engage in restrictive business practices in a "twilight zone"
where no State can fully exercise jurisdiction and yet harmful
effects of such restrictive business practices may be felt in one or
more States. To say that there should be no extraterritoriality of
any kind in the application of competition rules would mean
that such transnational entities can engage in anti-competitive
conducts with impunity.
There is of course the consideration that an extraterritorial
application of competition rules is a costly business both for the
enforcement agency and for the foreign defendants, and that it
is often a second-best solution to a problem which essentially
inquires how to cope with transnational anti-competitive conduct. An extraterritorial application of competition rules is
often not as effective as it would be if applied domestically. A
State which attempts to apply its anti-competitive laws extraterritorially to a defendant enterprise located abroad could always
face difficulties of enforcement and considerations of forum
and jurisdiction. There could also be disabling legislation in a
foreign State which may effectively preclude extraterritoriality.
The Watchmakers of Switzerland case"" of 1955 exemplifies the
essential commercial law principle of the United States, that applicability of antitrust laws on foreign enterprises may often entail conflict with legislation of other States. The court in this
case held that a watch repair enterprise, conducted in the
United States by two Swiss corporations, could be subjected to
the domestic laws of the United States.185 The court further
held that, in order for a foreign corporation to be present
within the jurisdiction of a court for the purpose of service of
process, there must be proof of continuous local activities and a
showing that under all circumstances of the case the forum is
not unfairly inconvenient.' 86 Even though the two Swiss entities
had no property in the United States and did not carry out their
activities directly (the business activities of the Swiss corporations were carried out by an American corporation in the
United States), the court further held that the Swiss corpora184 United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
185 Id. at 47.
186

Id. at 48.
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tions could be subjected to antitrust statutes and tariff laws of
the United States since the Swiss corporations determined the
prices and terms of the business enterprise."8 7
The watershed case of Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena Belgian

World Airlines18 held that territoriality-based jurisdiction allows
states in the United States to regulate conduct or status of individuals or property within a territory even if the effects of that
conduct are felt outside that territory; conversely, conduct
outside a territory, which is calculated to have a substantial effect on that territory, may also be similarly regulated. l 9 The
court also held that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing conduct of its nationals whether such conduct takes
place inside or outside the territory of that state. 190 Accordingly,
the plaintiff (Laker Airways Limited, a British corporation seeking remedy in the United States), whose activities in question
occurred outside the United States, was deemed to be subject to
United States antitrust legislation on the basis that such activities
gravely impaired United States interests. 191 In deciding upon
the contentious question of whether the law of the United Kingdom should apply to the plaintiff, the court compared the diametrically opposed antitrust legislation of the United Kingdom
and the United States and held:
We find no indication in either "the statutory scheme or prior
judicial precedent thatjurisdiction [by the United States] should
not be exercised. Legitimate United States interests in protecting consumers, providing for vindicating creditors' rights, and
regulating economic consequences of those doing substantial
business in our country are all, advanced under the congressionally prescribed scheme. These are more than sufficient jurisdictional contacts under United States v. Aluminum Co. of America and

subsequent case law 9to2 support the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in this case.'

In the United States, the scope of antitrust legislation and protection extend to those persons who are either directly or indirectly affected adversely by antitrust violations by third parties.
The adverse effect on the plaintiff must be one that the laws
were written to guard against. An example of this principle is In
Id. at 47-48.
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
189 Id. at 921-22.
190 Id. at 922.
191Id. at 924.
187
188

192

Id. at 945-46 (citations omitted).
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re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,9 a 1979 case in which a business
entity indulged in a "tying arrangement"19 4 to sell its product
and was held in violation of antitrust legislation. The tie-in resulted in a drop in demand for the product concerned, giving
way to a drop in prices and adversely affecting other competitors
9 5
of the product in the market.

The role of WTO in extraterritoriality becomes significant
when one considers the eventuality that extraterritorial application of competition rules may become too costly or burdensome
on States concerned. WTO offers the alternative of its own dispute settlement process and a framework within which members
may seek positive comity and a certain convergence or harmonization of competition rules. There have been several proposals
for convergence, the most practical and well thought out of
which is the Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) proposed by a group of competition law scholars called the Munich
Group.'96 The DIAC proposes that there should be a comprehensive international antitrust code covering the major areas of
competition law such as horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, mergers and acquisitions, the relationship between competition law and industrial policies and others. It also
recommends the establishment of an international antitrust
agency which shares the responsibility of enforcement of international competition rules with the national governments.
Ideas expressed in the DIAC are similar to Chapter V of the
ITO Charter, giving one the impression that the DIAC may well
have been drafted along the lines of the schemes of international antitrust enforcement contemplated by the ITO Charter.
The DIAC remains the most ambitious of the proposals made so
far in recent years.
Another attempt at international antitrust regulations is reflected in the work of a task force established by the American
Bar Association which issued a report advocating an agreement
among States with regard to some basic principles on unlawfulIn re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
A tying arrangement is the sale of one item (the tying product) on condition that the buyer take the second item (the tied product) from the same
source. Such arrangements are per se unreasonable and violate antitrust laws if
the tie-in involves two distinct products, and the party has sufficient economic
power in the tying market to impose significant restraints in the tied product
market. Id. at 401.
193

194

195

Id.

196 InternationalAntitrust

Code Will be Studied by GATT Members, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 (Aug. 19, 1993).
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ness of cartels and unification of filing requirements under the
merger laws of various States.19 7 The report contains a modest
recommendation seeking partial harmonization through an
agreement among States on basic principles and does not seek
the establishment of a comprehensive international authority to
enforce international rules.
Professor Eleanor Fox of New York University Law School has
developed the idea of the DIAC further, proposing a scheme in
which States would agree on "a few fundamental world-linking
principles" of competition policy such as prohibition of cartels
and positive comity. 9 ' Fox's proposal basically requires each
State to carry out convergence of competition rules while adopting fundamental principles established in an international
agreement.
The advantage of the DIAC approach to establishing an international code is that in such an instrument, rules and obligations of member States would be clear and member States would
have a clear goal to achieve. A somewhat similar approach has
been made within the framework of the WTO in the area of
intellectual property. The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 199 clearly lays out principles with
regard to the minimum protection of intellectual property
rights and the enforcement of the rights under intellectual
property laws, and members are obligated to incorporate these
principles in their domestic legislation, while allowing for a
grace period in the case of developing countries. It would not
be incorrect to say, therefore, that in this respect the DIAC approach has a precedent in the WTO system.
The disadvantage of a comprehensive international code approach may be that it lacks flexibility. It is often true that when
comprehensive principles are already declared, member States
have no choice but to accept them, and there may well be justification to consider principles other than those declared in the
code which may be more feasible. There could even be possibilities of applying different combinations of such principles.
Report of Special Committee on InternationalAntitrust, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. ANTI31.
198 See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-First CenturyRounding the Circle, 18 REcoRD 535 (1993).
199 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
197

TRUST

854

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

As mentioned earlier, TRIPs is an attempt to accomplish convergence of intellectual property laws of members. If TRIPs
proves to be successful, then an international code approach
may be a good prospect as a model for international competition. laws. Since TRIPs was formally initiated only at the beginning of 1995, it is premature to predict the prospect of domestic
implementation of such a scheme by members at the present
time.
Yet another approach is the "installment" or "evolutionary"
approach, for which there is an important precedent in WTO.
This precedent, which is adopted in GATS, provides for a general scheme for future negotiations in the liberalization of trade
in services within the general principles of the most-favored nation treatment clause and transparency clause. At the present
time, the liberalization of trade in services is largely left to future
negotiations, and GATS only provides for a scheme of negotiation. This is largely due to the fact that trade in services is a
complex field involving complex and diverse issues. Admittedly,
however, it is encouraging that the GATS scheme could be
drawn on by members if the need arises in the future..
As to the question whether the GATS negotiating scheme
should be adopted with regard to international competition policy, the main consideration should be that, if the question is
ever considered, it should be contemporaneous with the consideration of a scheme within the WTO for negotiating international antitrust principles. Negotiations may be on a total
harmonization or a partial harmonization basis. Such an approach would have the advantage of making it possible for members to introduce -a variety of international competition
agreements out of which they could select a suitable one. Also,
if this approach is adopted, it would be important for members
to have a firm commitment to promote competition law and
policy both internationally and domestically. Such a commitment should be clearly declared. Also, it may be necessary to
establish, as in GATS, a time schedule within which negotiations
should be carried out.
A declaration of fundamental principles of competition would
also be necessary. This declaration should contain analogous
provisions to most favored nation treatment, national treatment,
and transparency. Consideration should, furthermore, be given
to prohibition in principle of cartels, -resale price maintenance,
boycotts, and others. One should, at the same time, be cautious
that, given the wide variety of principles followed by members
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with regard to other areas, such as mergers and acquisitions, vertical non-price restraint, and predatory pricing, it may be feasible merely to declare general and abstract principles that
require members to promote competition policy in such areas.
Admittedly, WTO is not the only forum in which a scheme of
convergence of competition laws can be accommodated.
UNCTAD has done considerable work on this subject and is,
along with OECD, an eminently suitable forum. There is compelling reason, however, for such a scheme to be considered
under the WTO umbrella due to the volume of Membership
that WTO carries. Not all of the more than 125 States that participated in the Uruguay Round leading to the establishment of
the WTO Agreement have competition laws, and many are not
yet ready for them. When an international competition code is
drafted, it is logical to expect a certain degree of universality in
its principles and such could be accomplished on a wider scale,
given WTO's membership.
Professor Petersmann has recommended that an international competition code may be accommodated as an agreement of Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, which contains
optional agreements. °° Petersmann examines the idea of a
smaller number of nations entering into such an agreement initially, such as the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and
members of the European Community. A grace period for developing States to join the agreement has also been addressed.
He believes that, at least in the initial stage, an international
competition code among a smaller number of members may
work more effectively. Such an agreement may, according to
20 1
Petersmann, address "market access" issues effectively.
Generally, it is felt that the inclusion of an international competition code in the WTO Agreement would have an advantage
in that coordination between competition policy and other policies embodied in WTO agreements such as TRIPs, the Safeguard Agreement, and the Antidumping Agreement would be
accomplished more easily than if a competition code were established separately from WTO. Another envisaged advantage is
that the dispute settlement process incorporated in Annex 2 of

200

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Negotiating International Competition

Rules in the GA7T"-WF0 World Trade and Legal System, 49 AUSSENWRTSCHAFT 231-77

(1994).
201 Id.
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the WTO Agreement could be utilized when a dispute arises relating to the enforcement of competition laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the only similarity between the competition rules of
the existing bilateral structure relating to the air services agreement and WTO competition rules is the insistence by both systems on the requirement of fair and equal opportunity. The
current bilateral structure of the air services negotiations will remain in force as long as States subjectiviely consider the potential of air traffic that their carriers would have over others, by
excluding others from given market segments. This the States
can do, not only because of Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, but also by virtue of the underlying principle of sovereignty
legally entitling a State to prohibit a carrier from flying into or
out of its territory without that State's permission. As the preceding discussion has revealed, the protectionist attitude that
pervades commercial air transport is not limited to struggling
carriers of developing nations but applies to mega carriers that
"protect" what they believe to be a legitimate share of their market. Against this backdrop, the term "market access" can only
be used with the word "reciprocity." The status quo in commercial aviation is, therefore, by no means consistent with the competition principles advocated by WTO.
If the concept of "market access" of commercial aviation is to
be in consonance with WTO competition rules, the first step the
aviation community must take is to change its overall philosophy
and consider all international air traffic as international property rather than national property.' This calls for a radical
change in international policy on the subject of air traffic rights.
Individual States would be considered as having an overall duty
towards their citizens, and citizens would be considered as units
of a community of nations, rather than as units of a particular
State. In other words, States would represent citizens as nationals of an international society. The international traffic market
would then be taken as a whole, -and nations would adapt themselves to an extranational approach in sharing international air
traffic. Once the extranational philosophy is in place, it would
not be difficult to consider extraterritoriality in competition in a
manner compatible with WTO competition rules, particularly in
the context of the latter's emphasis on uniformity. The principles of transparency, most favored nation treatment, and dispute resolution could then fall into place.
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Although the above proposal may sound logical and workable, in. practice it cannot be denied that States have jealously
guarded their historical rights to air traffic over the past fifty-one
years and would, therefore, be reluctant to embrace a multilateral approach to enter into open competition.

